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  既 
Preface 
 
This volume presents a collection of papers which were read at the annual workshop 
on Environmental Economics and Satellite System held on March 10 in 2003 at Institute of 
Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.   
The first paper, “An Economic Analysis of Polluter-Pays Principle: Introducing 
'Allocated Costs' between Agents”, written by Professor Hideo Koide presents a reappraisal of 
the PPP by employing a simple general equilibrium model. This may be the first attempt to 
clarify a configuration of economic mechanisms based on PPP. 
  The second paper, “Japanese Long Term Environmental Statistics estimated by using 
Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounts”, written by Mr. Zoltan Denes (a Ph.D. 
candidate of Hitotsubashi University) provides a Japanese long term environmental estimate for 
1955-1995 employing the NNW, SEEA and NAMEA with additional data. This may be the first 
long term environmental estimate based on national accounts.   
  The third paper, “Survival of the Coal Industry: Adaptation of the US coal Industry to 
Challenges faced since 1949”, written by Mr. Peter Galante (a graduate school student of 
Hitotsubashi University) presents his efforts to clarify developments of the US coal industry as 
the major source of electric power in a historical perspective. Although this paper needs to be 
completed in a more academic manner, its topics and main assertions are rather interesting.   
  The fourth paper, “Developments in the Californian RECLAIM Scheme (in Japanese)”, 
written by Professor Sung-Chun Jung clarifies recent developments in the RECLAIM (Regional 
Clean Air Incentives Market) scheme in California as an attempt of implementation of 
emissions trading scheme.   
  The final paper, “Tasks and Prospects of Waste Processing Institutions (in Japanese)” 
written by Mr. Arata Abe (a Ph.D. candidate of Hitotsubashi University) provides his 
preliminary observations on institutional frameworks for processing wastes in a comparative 
view.  
  The volume will be useful for all economists who are interested in the analyses of 
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Recent Development in Environmental Economics 2003 
An Economic Analysis of Polluter-Pays Principle: 
Introducing ‘Allocated Costs’ between Agents 
 
Hideo KOIDE  3 
 
 
An Economic Analysis of Polluter-Pays Principle: 










The aim of this paper is to clarify both original and extended definitions of “Polluter-Pays 
Principle,” point out the shortcomings of the theoretical analysis frequently used in environmental 
economics, and then build a simple general equilibrium model showing several ways of internalizing 
social costs emerged by pollution from production of goods, with an introduction of so called “allocated 
costs” between economic agents concerned. This is an economic attempt to determine whether the 
Polluter-Pays Principle could be held or modified depending on informational certainty about abatement 
costs. 
As a result of obtaining efficiency under the externalities, a “Complete Polluter-Pays 
Principle” is required only if the social costs due to pollution are internalized by setting allocated and 
abatement costs and the latter are known to both the polluter and the pollutee. In contrast, when the 
pollutee does not know the abatement costs while the polluter does, they should bear the external costs 
fifty-fifty as the allocated ones while the polluter bears the abatement ones as well. The former situation 
can be expressed as an “Equally-Pays Principle.” Furthermore, a “Complete Pollutee-Pays Principle” is 
required when the abatement costs are unknown to both agents and thus the allocated ones are only 
available. Finally, it is almost impossible to internalize the social costs without the allocated ones. 
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1.  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to clarify both original and extended definitions of 
“Polluter-Pays Principle,” point out two shortcomings of the theoretical analysis frequently 
used in environmental economics, and then build a simple general equilibrium model showing 
several ways of internalizing social costs emerged by pollution from production of goods, with 
an introduction of so called “allocated costs” between economic agents concerned. This is an 
economic attempt to determine whether the Polluter-Pays Principle could be held or modified 
depending on informational certainty about abatement costs which the polluter should bear
1.  
In recent years, the meanings of the Polluter-Pays Principle have varied 
considerably between objectives of environmental laws or policies and countries enforcing 
them, although the original one proposed by OECD about thirty years ago was quite simple. 
This paper does not follow up the history of the Principle steadily, since Nash (2000) carries 
out the thorough survey (see also Otsuka (2002) in cases of Japanese environmental laws). As 
the economic interpretation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, a work by Pezzey (1988) is very 
useful for classifying many types of Principles adopted into a “Standard PPP” and an 
“Extended PPP,” and Turner et al. (1994) refer to it effectively in their elementary explanation. 
In discussing a nature of the Polluter-Pays Principle, environmental economists frequently use 
a diagrammatic model for minimization of the social costs, defined as the sum of abatement 
costs and external ones, showing that the social optimality is obtained at the point where the 
marginal abatement costs are equal to the marginal external ones. 
Additionally, Stevens (1994) points out that the Polluter-Pays Principle has two 
                                                      
1  In this paper, two verbs, to “pay” some costs and to “bear” the ones will be used in the same 
meaning. Thus, they would appear interchangeably in the text. The reason is that, as a basic analysis, it 
concerns only efficiency, not equity. Therefore, the actual incidence of the costs remains to be solved on 
another occasion. 5 
essential functions, which are a “Cost Internalization” and a “Cost Allocation.” However, the 
existing analyses have mostly discussed the former within a partial equilibrium framework, 
that is, how much should be paid for internalizing externalities due to pollution. The model 
presented in this paper investigates the latter as well, that is, who should pay the costs related 
to such pollution, or what proportion of the costs should be paid by each agent, namely, a 
polluter and a pollutee. It is easily found that we can say nothing about the cost allocation 
using the existing model where only the polluter is active, although the concept of the cost 
allocation is much important in the real world where bearing the social costs among multiple 
agents related by market transactions is quite common. This is a reason why the allocated 
costs must be introduced to internalize externalities among the agents concerned within a 
general equilibrium framework. 
We can say that, as a result of obtaining efficiency under the externalities, a 
“Complete Polluter-Pays Principle” or the Extended PPP by Pezzey’s definition is required 
only if the social costs due to pollution are internalized by setting allocated and abatement 
costs and the latter are known to both the polluter and the pollutee. In contrast, when the 
pollutee does not know the abatement costs while the polluter does, they should bear the 
external costs fifty-fifty in the form of the allocated ones while the polluter bears the 
abatement ones as well. This situation can be expressed as an “Equally-Pays Principle” 
combined with the Standard PPP by Pezzey’s definition. Furthermore, a “Complete 
Pollutee-Pays Principle” is required when the abatement costs are unknown to both agents and 
hence the allocated ones are only available! Finally, it is almost impossible to internalize the 
social costs without the allocated ones, regardless of informational certainty about the 
abatement ones. 
The paper proceeds in the following. We begin by showing the definitions of the 
original and extended Polluter-Pays Principles and the related useful terminology in Section 2. 6 
The existing diagrammatic model is also presented in that section with pointing out the 
analytical weaknesses. Next, in Section 3, we introduce a simple general equilibrium model 
with externalities and derive the Pareto optimum conditions. Additionally, in Section 4, we 
examine whether such optimality can be obtained using the allocated and/or the abatement 
costs to internalize the social ones, dividing the possibilities into four cases according to 
informational certainty about the abatement costs or the allocated ones. Finally, we conclude 
this analysis with some remarks in Section 5. 
 
2.    Discussions on the Polluter-Pays Principle 
In this section, we first show the definitions of the original and extended 
Polluter-Pays Principles and the related useful terminology. Remember that we do not follow 
the long history of these Principles in detail but focus on the theoretical ways of sorting them 
out to clarify the points at issue. Then, we present briefly the famous diagrammatic model of 
explaining the Principles, and point out its analytical weaknesses which could be overcome by 
the model shown in the next section. 
The Polluter-Pays Principle was originally proposed by OECD in 1972. The 
following paragraph is cited from Annex I to “Recommendation of the Council on Guiding 




The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control 
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter-Pays 
Principle”. This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of 
                                                      
2  Paragraph 4 of Annex I to “Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles Concerning 
International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies,” C(72)128, OECD, 26 May 1972. 7 
carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure 
that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these 
measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause 
pollution in production and/or consumption. Such measures should not be 
accompanied by subsidies that would create significant distortions in international 
trade and investment. 
 
As we can see, the original Principle is quite simple in that it requires (1) the 
allocation or burden of the costs for pollution prevention and control, and (2) the imposition of 
the burden of these costs on the polluter. It can be understood that, from this passage, the 
polluter’s responsibility is limited and some compensation for his/her polluting activity to the 
pollutee is not necessary. Also notice that, to avoid needless confusion, this Principle calls for 
realizing or improving cost efficiency by nature, not some distributional equity between the 
economic agents concerned. The latter is in fact another problem. 
Since this recommendation was made, the notion of the Polluter-Pays Principle has 
been gradually developed in thirty years, especially in industrialized countries coping with 
their serious environmental problems including pollution ones
3. At the same time, it has 
caused many different interpretations or abuses of the Principle
4. To get rid of the confusion 
and make its essence clearer, Pezzey (1988) classifies many Principles into two types, such as 
(1) a “Standard PPP” and (2) a “Extended PPP.” The former requires that, in net terms, the 
polluter should pay the costs of optimal effluent control, but not for the pollution damage done 
by the remaining optimal effluent or residual pollution. In contrast, the latter requires that, also 
                                                      
3   The short report distributed by OECD (1992) gives an outline of developments of the Polluter-Pays 
Principle after twenty years from adopting the original one (“The Polluter-Pays Principle: OECD 
Analyses and Recommendations,” OCDE/GD(92)81, OECD, Paris). 
4  For the detailed history of the Polluter-Pays Principle, see Nash (2000). The recent report prepared 
by Henri Smets (Association pour le développement de l’économie et du droit de l’énvironnement, 
Paris) is also useful (“The Polluter-Pays Principle as it Relates to International Trade,” 
COM/ENV/TD(2001)44/FINAL, OECD, 23 Dec 2002). 8 
in net terms, the polluter should pay the costs of optimal effluent control and for the pollution 
damage done by the remaining optimal effluent
5.  
In terms of environmental economics, it can be said that the Standard PPP 
corresponds to paying “Abatement Costs (AC),” and the Extended PPP to the sum of them and 
“External Costs (EC).” Needless to say, the original Polluter-Pays Principle by OECD matches 
the first definition by Pezzey, that is, the payment of AC only. Rather, the second one or the 
payment of both AC and EC has been mainly applied to the practices of cost bearing and 
compensation for the damage caused by pollution activities in various contexts. Economic 
analyses have tried to clarify how the external costs can be “internalized” to the individual 
economic decisions made by the polluter or other agents since A. C. Pigou. Here it is 
important to point out that there may be the case where the abatement costs cannot be fully 
internalized or these are unknown to a particular agent for some practical reasons. In this 
situation, the Principles mentioned above may be insufficient to realize the efficiency even if 
the externalities can be internalized.   
One more useful point of view is proposed by Stevens (1994). He argues three 
interpretations of the existing Polluter-Pays Principles, such as (i) a “Cost Allocation” for 
domestic environments, (ii) a “Cost Internalization” for them, and (iii) a Cost Internalization 
for shared (or global) environments
6. The Cost Allocation asks who should pay, while the Cost 
Internalization matters how much should be paid. It seems that the previous analyses of the 
externalities have been devoted mostly to examine the latter (for example, deriving optimal 
values of a tax or subsidy rate and a price of a tradable permit that the polluter pays or 
receives), but giving little attention to the former. The reason is that the costs are unable to be 
allocated since the models assume no agent except the polluter. Moreover, it is important to 
                                                      
5  Pezzey  (1988),  pp.208-209. 
6  Stevens  (1994),  pp.579-589. 9 
consider whether the abatement costs could be internalized besides the external ones, as 
mentioned previously. 
The representative model frequently used to explain the Polluter-Pays Principle can 
be described as follows. Assume that a producer of goods is also a polluter because one unit of 
production  Q yields the same unit of pollution. The abatement costs are assumed to be 
( ) Q Q c − , where  Q  is the maximum pollution in the absence of abatement. The remaining 
pollution, not abated by the polluter, imposes external costs e (Q) on society. Assume that 
these costs are increasing and convex in each variable, namely,  0 and , 0 , 0 , 0 > ′ ′ > ′ > ′ ′ > ′ e e c c . 
As a rule, the social costs are defined as the sum of the abatement and the external costs. 
Using these assumptions, we obtain the optimum of this model by minimizing the 
social costs. Figure 1 shows only the result, where MAC and MEC represent the marginal 
abatement costs and the marginal external costs curves, respectively. The intersecting point SO 
expresses the social optimum where the social costs are minimized, and the optimal amount of 
production or pollution Q
* is derived by the first-order condition  ( ) ( )
* * Q e Q c ′ = ′ . The 
corresponding abatement costs and external ones are represented by the areas of AC and EC, 
respectively. According to the definitions by Pezzey, the polluter should pay only AC as the 
Standard PPP, while paying both AC and EC as the Extended PPP. Notice that, in this model, 
the abatement costs are certainly internalized by the polluter.   
 
 
<< Figure 1.    The Optimum of the Partial Equilibrium Model. >> 
 
 
We point out two analytical weaknesses of this model. First, there is no way of cost 
allocation since it is a partial equilibrium model containing only a polluter. Hence, we cannot 10 
give any theoretical answer to the issue about allocating the costs mentioned by Stevens. More 
assumptions should be introduced to examine this theme. Second, pollution abatement should 
be distinguished from a reduction in production in order to allow other effective activities, 
such as reuse, recycling, and recovery of used goods. The assumption placed on the abatement 
of pollution is so simple that it may exclude possibilities to prevent or control the pollution 
which are independent of the production of goods. It seems natural that, in order to reduce 
pollution, the polluter would prefer to use some cost effective means rather than reduce the 
amount of production itself if he/she has some alternatives. This also reflects the present 
situations advancing numerous technologies of pollution control or recycling. 
Regarding these points, we present a general equilibrium model which involves 
both cost internalization and its allocation in the next section. Before doing, we introduce two 
more important factors. The one is called “Allocated Costs (LC).” These are in the form of 
internalizing external and/or abatement costs, distributed to the two economic agents 
concerned. The agents assumed in the model are a polluter who is also a producer, and a 
pollutee who is also a consumer. The notion of the allocated costs allows us to find the 
appropriate cost allocations. Another factor is the informational certainty about the abatement 
costs or the allocated ones. The previous model assumes perfect information, while we 
investigate several uncertain cases to see whether the absence of information affects the results 
of cost internalization and its allocation. It will be found that it does. 
 
3.  Theoretical  Model 
In this section, we present a general equilibrium model in the presence of 
externalities due to pollution emitted by a producer, and derive the Pareto optimum conditions 
in assuming only interior solutions. As previously mentioned, we assume two representative 
economic agents, which are a “polluter” who is also a “producer,” and a “pollutee” who is also 11 
a “consumer.” The former produces consumption goods, emits pollution accompanied by the 
production, and reduce or abate the pollution. Both production and abatement must use labor 
provided by the latter that consumes the goods and suffers damage from the pollution as an 
increase in disutility.   
In the following paragraphs, we introduce mathematical assumptions of the model. 
First, a consumer’s utility function is assumed to be 
[ ], , , E L Q u U ≡                                      ( 1 )  
where  Q,  L and E are the amounts of consumption goods, leisure and “net” pollution, 
respectively. The term “net” is used since the “gross” pollution from production can be 
reduced by using labor as described below. We assume that either increases in the first two 
variables or a decrease in the other increase the utility marginally, that is, 
0 and 0 , 0 < > > E L Q u u u . Assume also that this function is concave in each variable and that 
all the cross partial derivatives are zero for simplicity, such as  0 , 0 , 0 < < < EE LL QQ u u u  and 
0 = = = LE QE QL u u u . 
Second, we give assumptions on the side of the producer. A production function of 
the consumption goods is simply defined as 
( ),
Q X f Q ≡                                      ( 2 )  
where X
 Q is the amount of labor used for the production
7. In addition, it is assumed to be an 
increasing function and exhibits concavity, that is,  0 and 0 < ′ ′ > ′ f f . On the other hand, the 
producer also engages in pollution abatement whose function is assumed to be linear
8, such as 
,
A X A β ≡                                       ( 3 )  
                                                      
7  Some material could be introduced as an input combined with labor to make the model more 
realistic, but it has no effect on the main implications of this analysis. 
8    Linearity is the simplification of the model. Assuming nonlinear function needs the inverse function 
of A to be substituted for Equation (5), as described in Footnote 10. 12 
where A and X
 A are the amounts of abatement and labor used, respectively. β is a positive 
coefficient and called a “marginal abatement of labor.” 
Third, an external costs function is defined as 
( ). , A Q e E EC ≡ ≡                                   ( 4 )  
For simplicity, we assume that a unit of net pollution corresponds to the one of the external 
cost exactly, so that Equation (4) can be also seen as a net pollution function. We assume that 
the costs are increased by either an increase in the amount of production or a decrease in that 
of abatement,  0 and 0 < > A Q e e . It means that the production of goods causes external costs 
while the abatement of pollution yields external benefits to the contrary. Assume also that this 
function is concave in each variable and that the cross partial derivative is positive, or 
0 and 0 , 0 > < < QA AA QQ e e e
9.  
Finally, a resource constraint closing this model is set to be 
, L X X X
A Q + + =                                   ( 5 )  
where  X   is the total time given to the consumer.   
 
Now we are ready to examine a Pareto optimization problem which is represented 
by the maximization of the representative consumer’s utility subject to the constraints shown 
above. Set a Lagrangean for this optimization,   
[ ] () [ ]
() () [] , , , ,
, ,
Q X f A Q e
A
X X Q u














                      ( 6 )  
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier for the production constraint. Note that the resource 
                                                      
9   The last assumption means that the marginal pollution of production, eQ, increases as the amount of 
abatement increases since the pollution underlain is less than before. There may be the opposite case in 
some types of pollution. However, this change of the sign would affect almost no modification of the 
results.  13 
constraint and the pollution abatement function have been already substituted for leisure in the 
utility function, and also the net pollution has been replaced by the external costs function.   
Consider only the possibility of interior solutions. The Pareto optimum conditions 
of this problem are, therefore, 
, λ = + Q E Q e u u                                    ( 7 )  
, f uL ′ = λ                                      ( 8 )  
and , β A E L e u u =                                  ( 9 )  
. 0 = −Q f                                    ( 1 0 )  
The LHS of Equation (7) must be positive at the optimum, although its second term is 
negative due to the marginal disutility of pollution. In Equation (9), multiplying the disutility 
by the marginal pollution reduction due to abatement makes the RHS positive, which must be 
equal to the marginal utility of leisure, as appeared in Equation (8). The last equation is the 
constraint on the production of goods which is the same as Equation (2), of course. 
Combining equations (7) to (9), we obtain a familiar condition in general 
equilibrium theory that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to that of technical 

















                           ( 1 1 )  
It is not our purpose to clarify the properties of the equilibrium itself further, but to 
find ways of efficient cost internalization and allocation in decentralized decision makings by 
the economic agents. Before doing this, however, it may be informative to show whether the 
pollution abatement is promoted by increasing its productivity β . As shown in Lemma 1 and 
its proof below, this expectation is right in some range, but the production and hence the 
emission of the gross pollution will be also promoted at the same time! The net amount of 
pollution does not necessarily increase in these cases, however. 14 
 
[Lemma1]  If the marginal abatement of labor β is increased in assuming that 
β LL u W f + ′ ≡ Ω  is positive or negative but small in absolute values, (i) the amount 
of production increases, (ii) the amount of abatement increases, and finally, (iii) the 
net amount of pollution increases or decreases. Conversely, for sufficiently negative Ω, 
all the directions of these changes are uncertain. 
proof.  See  Appendix. 
 
4.  Internalization  of  Social Costs: Four Cases 
In this section, assuming perfectly competitive markets, we try to examine whether 
the Pareto optimality previously mentioned can be obtained using so called allocated costs 
(LC) and/or abatement costs (AC) to internalize the social costs (SC) in several situations. We 
divide the possibilities into four cases according to informational certainty about AC or LC. It 
can be said briefly that, after the following analysis, a difference in uncertainties about AC 
requires the different ways of cost allocation between agents concerned in addition to its 
internalization, and that the lack of LC fails to internalize the social ones.   
 
4-I.    Using LC and AC when both agents know AC. 
First, we examine a basic case where both LC and AC are available for cost 
internalization and both agents, the polluter and the pollutee, know AC precisely. This implies 
that AC should be borne primarily by the former since he/she is the only one that engages in 
abatement in the model. Notice that, as defined in Section 1, SC is the sum of AC and the 
external costs (EC). Therefore, the question is whether EC can be internalized by LC. The 
answer is yes, and it should be imposed on the polluter entirely. 
We assume that profits of the producer or the polluter are written by 
() [] () , , A Q c Q X f
A
X P Q P
Q c Q X Q θ λ
β






+ − ≡ Π                    ( 1 2 )  15 
where  λ
c is the multiplier for the production constraint,  1 0 ≤ ≤θ  is the “allocation rate” 
between the polluter (θ ) and the pollutee (1−θ ), and  ( ) A Q c ,  is the LC function. 
Furthermore, we assume its linearity for simplicity, such as 
() . , A C Q C A Q c LC
A Q + ≡ ≡                              ( 1 3 )  






A X = ≡                                 ( 1 4 )  
Maximization of the profits (12) gives the first-order conditions as follows. 
,
Q c Q C P θ λ + =                                   ( 1 5 )  
, f P








− =                                 ( 1 7 )  
. 0 = −Q f                                    ( 1 8 )  
Now we turn to a problem solved by the consumer or the pollutee. Set a Lagrangean 
for his/her utility maximization to be 






















X X Q u L




           ( 1 9 )  
where  E  is the level of net pollution unable to be controlled by him/her, and σ is the 
multiplier for the budget constraint which contains the portion (1−θ ) of LC as his/her costs. 
Conversely, AC is a benefit for him/her since it is received as a payment for providing labor to 
the pollution abatement. 
The first-order conditions for this maximization are, 
( ) , 1
Q
Q
Q C u P θ σ σ − − =                                ( 2 0 )  
, L
X u P = σ                                     ( 2 1 )  








− + =                             ( 2 2 )  16 






+ c Q P
A
X P
Q Q X θ
β
                          ( 2 3 )  
 
To realize the Pareto optimality under the decentralized decisions made by both 
agents, we require the following four conditions. First, by equations (16) and (21), the 
marginal utility of labor is equal to  f





c                                      ( 2 4 )  
Second, by equations (15) and (20), we have 
c Q








                                 ( 2 5 )  
This is the optimal marginal allocated costs in increasing production or pollution. 
Third, we find that, combined by equations (17) and (22), the marginal utility of 
labor is also equal to  β σ








                                ( 2 6 )  
Since it is negative, Equation (26) represents the optimal marginal allocated benefits in 
increasing pollution abatement. 
Finally, the equality  () 0 1 = −
A C θ σ  must be held from equations (21) and (22). 
For any σ > 0 and C
 A < 0 in Equation (26), the allocation rate must be unity, or 
. 1 = θ                                      ( 2 7 )  
Therefore, LC is not allocated in effect, but is imposed on the polluter entirely. Considering 
the circumstances mentioned above, we derive the following proposition and lemmas by the 
equations (27), (25) and (26). 
 
[Proposition1]  The polluter should bear the social costs alone at the Pareto 
optimum when both allocated and abatement costs are available and both agents 
know the latter.   17 
 
[Lemma2]  The marginal costs in increasing pollution with production borne by the 
polluter should be equal to the marginal disutility in monetary terms at the optimum. 
[Lemma3]  The marginal benefits in increasing pollution abatement received by the 
polluter should be equal to the marginal utility in monetary terms at the optimum. 
 
In this case, the cost allocation supported by Proposition 1 can be interpreted as a 
“Complete Polluter-Pays Principle,” or the Extended PPP by Pezzey’s definition. This analysis 
proves that these Principles have the theoretical validity in order to internalize SC efficiently. 
In addition, two Lemmas show the way of cost internalization in the form of the optimal 
marginal costs and benefits. 
Even if AC is not known to the pollutee and/or the polluter for some reasons 
(difficulties in measuring them precisely or asymmetric information not obtained by the 
outsiders, etc.), EC can be internalized using LC although the ways of optimal cost allocation 
would be different one another. It is assumed that, for simplicity, no knowledge of the costs 
means inability to control them. The possibility that only the pollutee knows the abatement 
costs is ruled out since he/she cannot reduce the pollution directly in this model.   
 
4-II.    Using LC and AC when only the polluter knows AC. 
In this case, the producer has the same condition as Equation (17), yielding 
() ( )
1 − − = βθ σ L
A u C  by substituting Equation (21). On the other hand, the corresponding 
equation in the utility maximization becomes  ( ) ( ) 0 1 = − − −
A
L C u θ σ β  simply, so that 
() ( ) ()
1 1
− − − = θ β σ L
A u C . The equalization of the two gives the allocation rate 
. 2 1 = θ                                      ( 2 8 )  
Hence, LC should be divided between the polluter and the pollutee equally, while 
AC is borne by the polluter, as is the previous case. This way of cost allocation can be 18 
expressed as an “Equally-Pays Principle,” combined with the Standard PPP by Pezzey’s 
definition. 
As for cost internalization, the marginal costs in increasing pollution are the same in 
Equation (25), while the marginal benefits in increasing pollution abatement are represented 
by  





                                ( 2 9 )  
It is negatively twice as much as (26) in the previous case.     
 
[Proposition2]  The polluter and the pollutee should bear the external costs 
fifty-fifty at the Pareto optimum when allocated and abatement costs are 
available and only the polluter knows the latter and so bears it.   
 
 
4-III.    Internalizing SC with LC only 
This corresponds to a case where it is desirable to use both LC and AC to 
internalize SC but neither of the agents knows AC. Thus, it is LC that is available in this case. 
Suppose the lack of information on AC in the decision makings of both agents. 
Instead of Equation (17), we have a simpler condition  0 = −
A C θ  which  requires  θ = 0 and/or 
C
 A = 0. However, the latter makes β in Equation (22) infinite in order to hold the condition 
without AC or the terms involving P
 X, which seems to be unrealistic and so neglected. On the 
other hand, the former possibility means that the pollutee must bear SC entirely while the 
polluter has no financial obligation. 
In this case, as the way of cost internalization, we have the same marginal allocated 
costs as in the equations (25) and (26), except the allocation rate that is 
. 0 = θ                                       ( 3 0 )  19 
This result can be called a “Complete Pollutee-Pays Principle.”   
 
[Proposition3]  The pollutee should bear the social costs alone at the Pareto 
optimum when only allocated costs are available. 
 
One reason why this curious phenomenon occurs is that, as seen in the solution 
process, we use the “linear” abatement function in the model. If the nonlinear one is assumed 
instead, the Complete Pollutee-Pays Principle is not necessarily efficient since we can accept a 
possibility of no abatement
10. Hence, the theoretical validity of Proposition 3 seems to be 
limited within this simplified framework. 
 
4-IV.    Internalizing SC with AC only 
When LC is not available for some reasons, the internalization of SC with the 
remained AC will be much difficult. There are two reasons for this difficulty. Here we 
examine only a case where both agents know AC because the conclusions will be almost 
unchanged in other uncertain cases. 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization of the producer are modified such 
as 
,
c Q P λ =                                     ( 1 5 ) ’  
, f P
c X ′ = λ                                    ( 1 6 ) ’  
                                                      
10    This footnote describes the nonlinear abatement case quite briefly. Assume a function 
( ) 0 , 0 , < ′ ′ > ′ ≡ g g X g A
A  and the inverse one  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 ,
1 > ′ ′ > ′ ≡ =
− G G A G A g X
A . In this setting, 
zero C
 A implies  0 = ′ G uL , resulting no abatement (A = 0) if a possibility of no leisure is excluded. This 
in turn induces  A Ee u   to be zero, which is consistent with no abatement since eA is equal to zero in that 
case. Therefore, in contrast to the main result, the allocation rate in equilibrium needs not to be zero. By 
the way, the conclusions in the previous cases remain the same in the presence of the nonlinearity.   20 
and , 0 =
β
X P
                                  ( 1 7 ) ’  
. 0 = −Q f                                    ( 1 8 ) ’  
Equation (17)’ requires β to be infinite for any positive price of labor, which is the first 
difficulty as we have seen the same possibility above
11. 
Similarly, the first-order conditions for utility maximization of the consumer are 
modified to be 
, Q
Q u P = σ                                    ( 2 0 ) ’  
, L





=                                 ( 2 2 ) ’  











                             ( 2 3 ) ’  
Obviously, equations (21)’ and (22)’ are the same. 





c                                  ( 2 4 ) ’  
. 0 = Q Ee u                                    ( 3 1 )  
The former condition has no problem. As for the latter, uE = 0 means that the externality does 
not exist because of no pollution due to perfect abatement (a case where the amount of 
production is equal to that of abatement, for example), while eQ = 0 indicates no production. 
Needless to say, both possibilities are extreme. Therefore, there seems to be no effective way 
of cost internalization, and it is appropriate to conclude that 
 
                                                      
11    In nonlinear case as in Footnote 10, Equation (17)’ is replaced by  0 = ′ G P
X   that can be held in the 
absence of the abatement. However, the second difficulty cannot be overcome by itself, and the 
inconsistency may arise with the extreme situations regarding Equation (31) in the following text. For 
reference, Equation (22)’ is replaced by  G u G P L
X ′ = ′ σ   which is of course the same as Equation (21)’. 21 
[Proposition4]  The internalization of the social costs will fail without applying 
allocated costs to the agents concerned. 
 




<< Table 1.    Four Cases of Cost Internalization and its Allocation. >> 
 
 
5.  Concluding  Remarks 
This paper has clarified both original and extended definitions of the Polluter-Pays 
Principle, pointed out the shortcomings of the theoretical analysis frequently used in 
environmental economics, and built the simple general equilibrium model showing several 
ways of internalizing social costs emerged by pollution from production of goods, with the 
introduction of allocated costs between economic agents concerned. 
Although the meanings of the Polluter-Pays Principle have varied considerably 
between objectives of environmental laws or policies and countries, the economic 
interpretation of the Principles by Pezzey is quite useful which classifies them into the 
Standard PPP and the Extended PPP. Moreover, Stevens points out the Cost Internalization and 
the Cost Allocation as the essential principles. The analysis we develop in this paper has used 
these terms as possible to evaluate the economic efficiency of the principles, although some 
unfamiliar terms have been introduced to express new results derived from the general 
equilibrium model. 
We repeat the four propositions here. First, the Complete Polluter-Pays Principle or 22 
the Extended PPP by Pezzey’s definition is required if the social costs due to pollution are 
internalized by setting allocated and abatement costs and the latter are known to both agents 
concerned. Second, when the pollutee does not know the abatement costs while the polluter 
does, the Equally-Pays Principle combined with the Standard PPP by Pezzey’s definition 
should be enforced. Third, a Complete Pollutee-Pays Principle is required when the abatement 
costs are unknown to both agents and so the allocated ones are only available. Finally, it is 
almost impossible to internalize the social costs without the allocated ones, regardless of 
informational certainty about the abatement ones. 
We have three remarks for the development of this research. First, the form of 
allocated costs and the ways of the allocation should be examined further. This analysis has 
shown that, with a simple modeling, allocated costs are the most important tools to internalize 
social costs as well as external ones. The situations must be more complicated if more agents 
and transactions are considered. Recently, OECD (2001) defines the practical meanings of the 
Extended Producer Responsibility as it includes physical and/or financial responsibilities, and 
also full or partial ones
12. Hence, how the costs should be allocated among the agents 
concerned must be highly important in the area of policy making, which depends on the form 
of the costs crucially. 
Second, the formal analysis of imperfect information should be applied to this 
problem. We have seen that the types of information on abatement costs affect both cost 
internalization and its allocation on the quite rough assumption that no knowledge of the costs 
means inability to control them. The theoretical sophistication must be needed for further 
examination. 
Third, we should clarify any incentives for the agents to avoid bearing the costs. In 
                                                      
12  OECD  (2001),  p.18. 23 
Section 4, we have examined the four cases separately. By comparing the results, it is found 
that pretending ignorance of information could benefit for the polluter, since it can shift the 
burden of the costs (abatement as well as allocated) to the pollutee! This work also requires 
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Appendix; Proof of Lemma 1.   
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Note that the first term of this equation is negative, the second is uncertain because of the sign 
of W, and the others are positive, respectively. 
The comparative statics conclude that 
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W f + ′ ≡ Ω                                   ( A 7 )  
Because the first term of Equation (A7) has either sign while the second one is negative, Ω 
may be positive or negative. 
As the first equation (A4) shows, with an increase in the marginal abatement of 26 
labor, the amount of production or gross pollution is increased if Ω is positive, or negative but 
small in absolute values. Likewise, Equation (A5) states that the amount of labor for the 
production changes in the same direction as this. 
In contrast, as we can see in Equation (A6), the amount of abatement is increased 
with this marginal change if Ω is positive. 
Finally, the net amount of pollution could change in either direction since 
() () () () [] .
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The System of National Accounts (SNA) is a comprehensive, standardized economic 
accounting system for regular collection, and consistent, rigorous presentation of economic data. It 
helps economic analysis, policy-making, and provides a number of economic indicators. It was 
designed to support economic theories that include that part of the environment only which qualify 
as economic assets. Other than economic assets (resource) depletion, environmental concerns are 
treated as an externality. It is also difficult to trace environmental-related spending and activities 
within the SNA accounts. 
In the 1990’s, however, the call for integrated environmental and economic theories and a 
supporting accounting system has got stronger, in light of the increasing scarcity of natural resources, 
and the continuous degradation of environmental quality due to excessive pollution. Not only do we 
have to attend immediate threats, but also strong evidence makes us believe that future generations 
will have to pay the price for our careless use of the environment. Therefore, the integration of 
environmental concerns and economic goals should rank high in any policy debate. What we want 
to achieve is generally referred to as ‘sustainable development’. One of the cornerstone documents 32 
of sustainable development, the Agenda 21 report (U.N. 1993/a), directly calls for the development 
and utilization of an integrated environmental and economic accounting framework. 
Two major integrated accounting approaches emerged in the 1990’s: The Satellite System 
of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA) advocated by the United Nations, and 
the National Accounting Matrix including Environmental Accounts (NAMEA) developed mainly in 
the Netherlands, and now widely used in the European Union. Approximately twenty countries 
published estimates based on one of the two systems. To the authors knowledge Japan is the only 
one, which published estimates for both frameworks (as of 2003), and the only country with 
NAMEA estimates outside Europe. SEEA estimates were published for every fifth year between 
1970 and 1995. Major indicators in the NAMEA were published for 1985, 1990 and 1994, but the 
full matrix was only published for 1994. 
Interest in accounting systems that include the environment goes back to the 1960’s and 
70’s in Japan. The ‘Net National Welfare’ framework was developed, and estimates made for every 
fifth year between 1955 and 1970. Estimation methods in the NNW served as a reference when the 
SEEA was developed. 
This paper will present the NNW, SEEA and NAMEA estimates in extended time-series 
from 1955 to 1995, and will observe as to what degree the environmental-economic reality in Japan 
is reflected in the integrated accounts, and what trends can be identified. At the same time, we can 
draw conclusions on how well these frameworks and estimates can serve the achievement of 
sustainable development, and give some ideas for future research. Before the presentation of the 
time-series, each framework is briefly introduced in the next section. 
 
II. Basic principles of integrated environmental and economic accounting frameworks 
 33 
II.1 The Net National Welfare 
 
There was a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the GDP as the foremost indicator of a 
country’s economic performance in the 1950’s and 60’. Research on the relationship between 
national income, welfare, production, consumption, environmental concerns and the measurement 
of these led to the first trials attempting to put the arguments into frameworks different from the 
SNA. The aim was to constructing a macro indicator that expresses welfare in monetary terms better 
than GDP.   
In 1973, NNW Committee of Japan suggested a framework and an indicator, the NNW, 
which can be considered as the first such accounting system
1 (NNW Measurement Committee, 
1973). The NNW is a forerunner of today’s ‘green GDP’ concept, thus an important contribution to 
integrated environmental and economic accounting. Such work at the time was prompted by the 
large-scale environmental damage in Japan, mainly in the form of industrial pollution, partly 
attributed to the high economic growth after World War II. Thousands of people fell ill or died in 
serious industrial pollution incidents, such as Minamata disease (mercury poisoning) or ‘itai-itai’ 
disease (cadmium poisoning). 
During the construction of the new indicator, the NNW, items that were either thought to 
have a negative effect on welfare, or did not have an immediate welfare increasing effect were 
subtracted from the NDP. At the same time, new categories, not part of the SNA, were made, 
monetary values imputed and added to or subtracted from the NDP, depending on their welfare 
effect. Although NNW is clearly a better welfare indicator than the NDP, it was not a comprehensive 
welfare measure, as it did not take income distribution, allocation of social capital, and social factors 
of welfare into account. 
                                                        
1  In 1972, Nordhaus and Tobin published a paper titled “Is growth obsolete?”. The indicator calculated in 
the paper is the Measure of Economic Welfare. However, it was based on models, surveys and indirect 
measurement methods specific to the United States. Moreover, MEW was designed to be a one-time 
estimate only, rather than an accounting framework for future use. 34 
The NNW is comprised of 9 categories: government consumption and private 
consumption expenditure, services from government capital stocks and from personal durables, 
leisure hours, household work, environmental maintenance costs, environmental pollution, and 
losses due to urbanization. Results of the estimation indicated that while the NDP had an annual 
growth rate of 4.9% between 1955 and 1970, NNW grew only 2.4%. The main factor behind the 
lower growth rate was the dramatically increased pollution and its imputed costs that were 
subtracted from the NDP. As this paper concentrates on the environmental linkages, two categories
2: 
the environmental protection costs and the imputed costs of environmental pollution will be 
discussed and used in the analysis in section III.   
 
II. 2. The Satellite System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA) 
 
The SEEA system, proposed by the United Nations (U.N. 1993/b and 2000), expands 
asset boundaries with non-economic natural assets, and establishes several subcategories for those 
already in the SNA. In addition to economic (natural) assets, natural assets include biological assets, 
land with its ecosystem, subsoil assets, water, and air. The quality and/or the quantity of the natural 
assets are recorded in physical terms first, and monetary valuation is strongly advocated where it is 
possible. Depletion is accounted for by the ‘net price’ or user ‘cost method’
3; whereas degradation 
(deterioration of environmental quality by pollution) is calculated by maintenance costing, which 
will be discussed in section III. The total amount of imputed costs of depletion and degradation is 
                                                        
2 Losses due to urbanization covered only two categories: increased commuting time and injuries from 
traffic accidents, which are not environmental concerns in the author’s opinion. 
 
3  Net price method estimates the value of a resource at the beginning of a period by multiplying the 
volume of total extractions during the lifetime of the resource with the difference between its unit market 
price and the unit cost of production. The user cost method calculates the difference between net returns 
from the sales of an exhaustible resource through its lifetime and the “perpetual income stream” that that 
results from the investment of the user cost at a given interest
 rate. 35 
subtracted from the NDP to arrive at the ‘environmentally adjusted domestic product’ (EDP), often 
referred to as ‘green GDP’, which is the foremost indicator derived from the SEEA. Between 1970 
and 1995 the total imputed environmental costs decreased. As a result, the difference between GDP 
and EDP decreased, implying that the growth rate of the EDP exceeded the growth rate of the GDP. 
 
II.3. The National Accounting Matrix including Environmental Accounts (NAMEA) 
 
The NAMEA framework addresses integration without monetary valuation. It is a direct 
extension of the National Accounting Matrix with environmental data without modifying the core 
system. In its original version, it includes two additional accounts for the environment; a ‘substances 
account’ to record physical flows of pollutants and resources, and an ‘environmental themes 
account’, which is the aggregation of substances into categories to reflect major environmental 
problems. These categories in the Japanese NAMEA are identical to those found in the Dutch 
NAMEA (de Haan and Keuning, 1996): acidification, eutrophication, waste, change in natural 
resources as national issues; global warming and ozone layer depletion as global problems. An 
environmental indicator for each of these issues is derived from the NAMEA, each of them having 
its own unit of measure, while the traditional economic indicators, such as GDP, are kept unchanged.   
A common feature of the SEEA and the NAMEA is the disaggregation of the SNA to 
identify environmental protection related expenditures, goods and services. The aim is to show the 
burden on industries to meet environmental standards, which affect their international 
competitiveness; and also to identify the growing business opportunities in the environmental 
protection industry.   
 
III. Long term time-series by linking estimates from the NNW to the SEEA and the NAMEA 36 
III.1 Monetary accounts 
 
Monetary accounts are the core of the NNW and the SEEA frameworks. The results of 
monetary estimations will be analysed first. As the NNW estimates cover the period from 1955 to 
1970 and the SEEA estimates extend from 1970 to 1995, it gives us the unique opportunity to try to 
establish extended time-series from 1955 to 1995. Presenting the findings in absolute monetary 
values, either in current or even constant prices would not give us enough insights on the trends, 
because of rapid economic growth of this period. Comparing values of environment-related 
monetary estimates to GDP provides us with a more comprehensible picture. Two time-series will 
be presented, the environmental-related expenditure, which was used to maintain environment 
quality at a certain level, and the imputed values of pollution by maintenance costing. Only key 
points of the estimations will be presented here, for further details see the original reports (NNW 
Measurement Committee (1973), Economic Planning Agency of Japan (1998), Ike (1999)). 
In the NNW the environmental protection costs are calculated by adding up (a) 
government current expenditures for the pollution control
4, (b) annual current costs imputed from 
capital stock for the prevention of pollution by the government sector, covering sewage and 
excrement treatment, and domestic wastes, (c) the same as (b) for the private sector, covering air and 
water pollution control, and waste treatment. The recording of environmental protection related data 
in the SEEA is more detailed. Environmental related products and services, environmental 
protection activities, and environmental protection assets are all accounted for. For the present 
time-series we will only look at the environmental protection spending, as asset accounts were not 
part of the NNW estimates. Environmental protection activities are those activities that produce 
environment-related goods and services and are either external or internal if done by industries, or 
they can also be carried out by the government. External activities, which are sold to other industries, 
                                                        
4  Data was not available before 1967, but the amount was considered to be negligible, anyway. 37 
covered waste disposal services, recycling, and environment assessment services. Internal 
environmental protection activities by industries covered air and water pollution control activities, 
and waste treatment. These activities were carried out within the same industry, where the pollution 
occurred. Government environmental protection activities covered waste water treatment and waste 
disposal services. We can see that the areas targeted for the estimations are largely the same in the 
NNW and in the SEEA, with the exception of environmental services, but these can be assumed 
negligible before 1970. There is a difference in the method of valuation, as the annual current costs 
of environmental protection related assets are not calculated in the SEEA, but estimates are based on 
investment values. The current costs imputed from capital stock in the NNW are close to the value 
of annual investment, albeit somewhat lower. Here, the original imputed values will be used.   
Presenting the environmental spending as the percentage of GDP, we can observe a very 
consistent trend (Figure 1). Environmental protection spending as percentage of the GDP steadily 
increased between 1955 and 1985, and after a slight drop in the second half of the 80’s it levelled off 
at around 1%. By looking at the components of these expenditures we can see that the government 
shouldered the majority of the costs in the first 20 years. Industries accounted for only about a third 
of the costs in 1965, whereas they covered two thirds of those in 1995.   
 38 
Figure 1. 
Environmental protection costs as percentage of the GDP
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Source: NNW Measurement Committee, 1973; Economic Planning Agency, 1998 
 
During the rapid industrialization after World War II private firms paid little or no attention 
to the environment, and government regulations and control were mostly absent too. The Basic Law 
for Environmental Pollution Control, which established environmental quality standards, was 
enacted in 1967, the Air Pollution Control Law in 1968, Water Pollution Control Law in 1970, and 
by 1973 most of the important pollution control legislations were introduced. The Environmental 
Agency was established in 1971, and regular monitoring of environmental quality started. Strict 
regulations forced the industries to immediately spend more on pollution control in the 70’s and 
early 80’s, thus environmental spending constantly increased. During the 1980’s the Japanese 
industrial structure saw a shift towards services and high value added industries (OECD, 1994), thus 
environmental spending stabilized at around 1% of the GDP. As a result of large necessary 
environmental-related investments, environmental protection related assets saw a nearly 8 fold 
increase between 1970 and 1985, while the total of man-made assets increased less than 3 times 
during this period. This meant that share of environmental protection related assets increased from 
1.3% to 3.4% and remained at that level until the end of the observed period.   39 
To arrive at the most commonly quoted indicator from the SEEA framework, the 
environmentally adjusted domestic product (often referred to as green GDP), we have to subtract the 
hypothetical costs of pollution that actually occurred and the value of the natural resource depletion. 
Due to theoretical concerns regarding such an operation
5, this will not be done here, but estimated 
values will be compared to magnitude of the GDP, as it was done with environmental spending.   
Japan has virtually no subsoil resources, and forests are not depleted. The value of 
depletion of resources, though calculated in the SEEA, is negligible
6  and will be excluded from the 
calculations here. The costs of pollution represent a much larger magnitude. The calculation of such 
hypothetical costs is still debated, but both in the NNW and in the SEEA the maintenance cost 
valuation method is applied. These are expenses  that  would have been incurred during the 
accounting period to avoid or mitigate the environmental damage that was actually caused, i.e. 
maintaining a certain level of environmental quality. The rational behind it is the internalisation of 
the social cost of pollution that is not paid by the polluters, and these values, of course, have no 
relation to the magnitude of the damage that is actually done.   
In the NNW estimates the pollution itself was divided into water pollution, air pollution 
and waste categories, which were further detailed, finally to arrive at the substances that cause 
pollution. 
 
-  Air pollution: immobile sources: SOx, soot & dust; mobile sources: NOx, CO, HC 
(hydrocarbon) 
-  Water pollution: BOD (biological oxygen demand) 
-  Waste: industrial and domestic waste 
 
Imputed cost of environmental pollution dramatically grew throughout the whole period 
                                                        
5  For details see: de Haan and Keuning, 1996   
6  Fish stock may have been depleted, but that was not targeted for calculation in the trial estimates. 40 
observed, and came to a staggering 6000 billion yen annually in 1970, more than 16 times of actual 
environmental protection spending in that year.   
 
The SEEA originally targeted the following areas for monetary valuation under the 
maintenance cost approach: 
 
-  Emissions to air: SOx, NOx, (CO2) 
-  Water pollution: BOD, COD, (nitrogen, phosphorus) 
-  Land development and deforestation 
-  Restoration of natural assets: polluted rivers, agricultural land: these values are added 
 
The monetary valuation of nitrogen and phosphates releases was not implemented, 
because there were doubts if it is justifiable to impute values based on the national volumes for these 
mainly local problems. The monetary valuation of CO2 emissions was also given up, because 
currently there is no way to avoid or prevent emission, neutralize CO2, or calculate forgone profits, 
had fossils fuels not been used. Therefore, these substances are in brackets above. 
Imputed maintenance costs increased until 1975, dropped sharply between 1975 and 1980, 
and remained around that level for the rest of the observed period. In 1995 these costs were less than 
actually spent environmental protection costs. This is substantial improvement compared to the ratio 
of 16 to 1 in 1970, mentioned above.   
The targeted problems for the estimation are similar in the NNW and in the trial SEEA. 
Air pollution included SOx, and NOx (NOx only from mobile sources in the NNW), and BOD as 
water pollution. Although the SEEA also covered COD, but the measures to reduce COD or BOD 
were thought to be the same, therefore the larger of the two values was used when estimating the 
imputed cost. BOD and COD discharges in physical terms were close. Therefore, we assumed here 41 
that the imputed maintenance costs are those necessary to reduce BOD discharge. Both in the NNW 
and in the SEEA, the sum of air and water pollution is responsible for the majority of the costs. 
There are some differences in the targeted problems in the two frameworks. HC and CO emissions, 
as well as waste discharge were included in the NNW, but were not part of the SEEA. Conversely, 
land development, deforestation, and restoration of natural assets in the SEEA were not part of the 
NNW, but with the exception of land development, the amounts are very small in magnitude.   
Due to these differences we cannot expect perfectly smooth time-series, as the two values 
for 1970 (the common year for estimations) will show these differences. Similarly to 
environmental-related expenditure, presenting the maintenance cost values as a percentage of the 





















Source: NNW Measurement Committee, 1973; Economic Planning Agency, 1998, Economic and 
                                                        
7  The calculations in Figure 2 are based on current values, both for the GDP and for the maintenance 
costs. Establishing time-series based on constant prices is troublesome. While time-series of GDP in 
constant prices is available for the whole period, it would be difficult to establish a suitable deflator for 
hypothetical costs based on given technologies, some of which were never employed. 42 
Social Research Institute, 2001 
 
The share of imputed environmental costs increased dramatically in the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
peaking at nearly 9% in the late 1960’s. The share of costs decreased sharply between 1970 and 
1985 and levelled off at around 1% of the GDP after that. This means that both the share of 
environmental related spending, discussed earlier, and the imputed environmental costs settled at 
approximately 1% of the GDP in the 1990’s. The picture we can see here shows very clearly how 
pollution got out of hand in Japan in the 1960’s, and how effective the strict regulations were 
introduced between 1967 and 1973.   
 
III.2. Physical accounts 
 
Although physical accounts are part of all three frameworks taken up for analysis here, 
there are principle differences regarding their roles. In the NNW and in the SEEA they mainly serve 
as the basis for monetary valuation, whereas in the NAMEA, physical accounts and indicators are 
the ultimate goal. The monetary accounts have the advantage that they have a common unit, 
therefore can be aggregated, and a final black or white picture drawn on the trends, as we saw in the 
previous section. Physical accounts and indicators based on them have different units, and while 
there may be an improvement in one, there could be a decline in another, which is often the case in 
reality.  
The NNW and the SEEA include pollution data in physical units, but there is no 
aggregation of these into environmental problem areas. Only the monetary values of their 
maintenance costs are aggregated. In the NAMEA, however, raw emission figures are aggregated 
into environmental problem categories (themes), as described in section II. In the NNW framework 
SOx, soot & dust, emission from automobiles (NOx, CO, HC), BOD and waste were accounted for. 43 
Emission of SOx, the discharge of BOD and domestic waste was chosen for the time-series here. 
Soot & dust do not appear in the NAMEA or in the SEEA, and NOx, HC and CO emissions only 
appear in the 1994 NAMEA, which is insufficient data for time series.   
Figure 3 shows the SOx release into the atmosphere between 1955 and 1995 as it was 
estimated in the NNW and in the SEEA. As we can see, there is a large difference in the values for 
1970. NNW estimates were based only on industrial fossil fuel use, but emissions from privately 
owned mobile sources were not estimated. SEEA estimates included those, however. Estimates for 
1975 (OECD, 1991) reveal that emissions from mobile sources were just over 4% of the total, which 
means that private cars could not have been responsible for more than 1-2%. Thus, correcting the 
estimates for private cars would not help to close the large gap. 
 
Figure 3. 


























Source: NNW Measurement Committee, 1973; Economic Planning Agency, 1998; Li and Dai, 
2000; OECD, 1991 and 1997; The Government of Japan, 1997 
 
Due to limited details in the NNW report, the author could not trace the root of largely 
different estimates, but instead, tried to establish a reference series to see which of the two estimates 
is more realistic. No reference values were found for 1955. Values for 1960-65 were taken from Li 44 
and Dai (2000); for 1970-1985 from OECD Environmental Compendium (1991and 1997); for 1990 
immobile source emissions were assumed to be the same as for 1989 (no data available for 1990) 
and added to stationary source emissions for 1990 (OECD, 1997); 1995 emissions were assumed to 
be the same as emissions for 1994 in Japan’s Second National Communication under the UNFCCC 
(The Government of Japan, 1997). The reference values are very close to estimates in the SEEA. It 
is very likely that emissions in the NNW were underestimated. Despite lower emission figures in the 
NNW framework, the trends are similar to that observable in the reference figures. Emissions 
increased sharply until 1970, and dramatically decreased after that, showing how powerful the 
measures were introduced in 1968 in the Air Pollution Control Law.   
  In Figure 4 we can see how BOD discharge changed during the 40-year period. As with 
the SOx figures, there is a difference in the 1970 values. This is the result of different surveys and 
models used in the estimation for the generation and removal of the pollutants
8. No reference values 
could be established regarding total BOD discharge as various data sets reviewed by the author 
detail concentration only. Despite different discharge values, not only can the sharply increasing 
trend until 1980 identified, but also the rate of increase in the two estimates are very close, as it can 
be seen in Figure 2. After 1980 discharge values dropped dramatically following the installation of 
equipment removing BOD.   
 
                                                        
8  In the NNW: survey of the Industrial Location Center and data from the Ministry of Construction & the 
Environmental Agency (non of these further specified), in the SEEA: Kunimatsu, T and Muraoka, K 
(1990). Model Analysis of River Pollution (in Japanese) Tokyo: Gihoudo Press and Japan Association of 
Industrial Machinery Manufacturers (various years). Production of Environment Equipment (in Japanese). 
























Source: NNW Measurement Committee, 1973; Economic Planning Agency, 1998 
 
  The demand for technologies reducing SOx emission and BOD discharge resulted in a 
dramatic increase in environmental equipment output, reaching its peak in 1976 at around ten times 
of the output ten years earlier (Nett21, 2003). Pollution-related investment in the private sector was 
21% of total investment expenditure in 1975, while this dropped to 2.5% in 1985. (OECD, 1994) 
(Environmental equipment output picked up again in the 1990’s to deal with dioxin emissions.) 
  We have seen that while trends can be identified, there is a large gap between physical 
data sets regarding emissions. If we used the same emission values, would not it change the 
relatively consistent picture of monetary values we discussed in the previous section? To check this, 
the original NNW emission data for SOx and BOD was modified to match the SEEA estimates, but 
the monetary valuation methods and models kept unchanged. For example, SOx emissions in the 
SEEA were about two times higher in 1970 than in the NNW estimates. Using this factor, the 
maintenance cost values (to remove SOx) in the NNW estimates were doubled. The same 
adjustment was made for BOD. At the same time, waste treatment costs were excluded, since they 46 
were not part of the SEEA. Similarly, categories other than water and air pollution were excluded 
from SEEA estimates. Calculations were made only for 1970 in current prices. Adjusted 
maintenance costs in the NNW came to 4807 billion yen, whereas modified SEEA estimates came 
to 4904 billion yen. The difference is only 98 billion yen, which is less than 2% of adjusted 
maintenance costs and 0.13% of the GDP. This difference is surprisingly little, considering that the 
original technical assumptions and valuation methods were kept. 
 The  SOx and BOD time-series can easily be connected to the trends seen in the monetary 
accounts. While some serious pollution problems started to decrease dramatically in the early 1970’s, 
such as the release of SOx, some, such as the BOD only improved a decade later, mainly during the 
first half of the 1980’s. As a result, imputed maintenance costs improved the most when several 
serious pollution problems declined simultaneously. BOD treatment facilities require large 
investments, which explain the sharp increase in environmental protection related assets, especially 
until the mid 80’s. 
  Finally, we will look at the household waste problem covered in the NNW and the 
NAMEA estimates. There is data for five years only: 1965, 1970 (NNW), 1985, 1990 and 1994 
(NAMEA). We can observe a consistent, slowly increasing trend in the generation of domestic 
waste. The reason for this is partly the growing population, and the few legal or economic incentives 
to reduce waste. Recycling only gained ground in the 1990’s, and maybe the reason behind the fact 
that there is almost no increase between 1990 and 1994. As with the SOx emissions, a reference 
database was used to check the data and to fill the gaps in the time-series. The Ministry of 
Environment (formerly the Environmental Agency) keeps records of collected waste and publish 
figures in the annual Environmental White Paper. In fact, NNW and NAMEA estimates also used 
this database, so there is no surprise that the figures in the estimates match the reference data. The 
only exception is the year 1970, when figures in the NNW estimates are nearly 3 million tons, about 
10%, less than the reference data, because waste transported by the generators of waste themselves 47 
to incinerators was excluded. The figures published in the Environmental White Papers include only 
waste that was generated within the boundaries of the waste collection areas. For total generation of 
waste we have to adjust the figures for the whole population. This is presented in Figure 5. We can 
see that the total of generated waste is largely underestimated until 1974, after which waste 
collection nearly covered the whole of Japan, but reached 100% only in 1992. A third line in Figure 
5 shows the waste generation per capita. We can see that per capita waste increased less than the 
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(right scale)
kg/year million tons/year Household waste generation
 
Source: Environmental Agency, Ministry of Environment: Environmental White Papers (various 
years), Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunication, 2002 
 
As detailed in section II, the Japanese NAMEA includes six environmental themes, which 
are constructed by the aggregation of numerous substances released. Apart from waste, however, no 
other category can be connected to the NNW estimates. Nevertheless, a brief introduction of the 
results will show how complex the picture of the national environment is for period between 1985 48 
and 1994. Eutrophication decreased by around 8%, and ozone layer depletion declined by over 80%. 
At the same time, acidification worsened by 9%, total waste generation increased nearly 25%, and 
emission of global warming substances grew by 32%
9. We can see rather substantial changes - good 
and bad - in all categories of environmental concerns. 
 
Figure 6 

























g/1000 yen (constant 1990 prices)
 
Source: Environmental Agency, Ministry of Environment: Environmental White Papers (various 
years), Economic and Social Research Institute (2001) 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
 
1.  After observing the trends in both the monetary and physical time-series, we can conclude that 
the worst period in the Japanese national environmental history was from the late 1960’s to the 
early 1980’s. Strict regulatory measures introduced around 1970, resulted in a much better 
                                                        
9  The values are expressed in theme equivalents: eutrophication in eutrophication equivalents (EEQ), 
ozone layer depletion in ozone depletion equivalents (ODP), acidification in potential acidification 
equivalents (PAE), waste in kilograms (kg) and global warming in global warming potential (GWP). 49 
environmental performance in several areas about a decade later. This is especially true 
concerning SOx emissions, which are among the lowest in the OECD (OECD, 2002).   
2.  The common unit of money can cover worsening environmental problems, as there may be 
substantial improvements in others and opposite changes cancel out each other. The Japanese 
SEEA estimates showed a stable, moreover, slightly improving national environment between 
1985 and 1995, whereas in the NAMEA estimates we saw that the picture is rather mixed if 
change is expressed in physical units. Environmental distributional matters are not reflected in 
imputed maintenance costs. GDP and other aggregate indicators do not show distributional 
concerns, either, but while real money can be redistributed, environmental gains (or losses) 
cannot. Improved ozone layer depletion cannot be compensation for worsening eutrophication. 
Therefore, it is important to always present the physical indicators along with monetary ones. 
Monetary estimations should have a major role in policy-making for the present or future. They 
have limited usefulness as indicators by themselves. 
3.  Monetary valuation of environmental problems has serious theoretical and practical limits. This 
is true even for maintenance valuation, which is the most easily executable among monetary 
valuation methods. CO2 emissions, nitrogen, and phosphorus emissions were excluded from the 
estimates due to such limits. Numerous environmental concerns, such as nuclear waste, noise 
pollution, dioxin, heavy metals, harmful chemicals, and others were not even considered for 
monetary valuation. Environmental problems covered in the SEEA had a rather limited scope. 
4.  There is a large amount of data in many different environmental categories in Japan. Most of 
these are published in annual reports or ‘white papers’. Despite such publications, there are no 
official figures for several basic environmental data sets, which are necessary for national 
integrated accounting purposes. Regular and consistent record and publication of the most 
important environmental data is of primary importance. The first such publication, the 
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The civilization in which we live was built on and continues to run on fossil fuel and coal has played a 
major role in this.    Coal was the main power source in the US until it was displaced by oil as the major 
fossil fuel in the mid 20
th century.
1    Along with the positive benefits derived from the use of coal in the 
five major sectors of the economy
2, there were also many negative impacts, which helped to bring 
environmental issues to the forefront of public interest in the 1960’s.    These concerns were embodied in 
environmental laws aimed at improving the quality of air in the US.  In addition to environmental 
concerns, coal faced increasing competitive pressure from nuclear energy, which in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s was seen as an inexhaustible source of energy which would become the fuel of choice for 
electricity production.     
With increasing environmental constraints (albeit weak at first) and increasing competition it seemed as if 
coal would be reduced to a minor role in the US energy landscape.  Yet, coal has proved resilient and 
has successfully adapted to the continually constraining conditions and market competition and in 2001 
coal production reached an all time high
3.   
There were four main reasons behind the resiliency of the coal industry and they are as follows: growth in 
demand for electricity, which increased demand for coal used for electricity generation; failure of coal’s 
competitors, namely nuclear power; adaptation to environmental legislation and increased market 
competitiveness.    This paper aims to look at these 4 factors. 
 
Reason 1: growth of demand for coal from the electricity production sector 
                                                        
1  Energy in the US 1635-2000 
2  defined as industrial sector, residential, transportation, energy production, commercial 
3  Coal Producer Survey 2001 58 
In 1949, final consumption of coal by the electricity production sector was only 17% of the 
total final consumption of coal.
4  At this time, by far the largest consumer of coal was the industrial 
sector at 44% of total final consumption.
5  The third largest consumer sector of coal, behind the 
electricity production sector, was the transportation sector at 15%, followed by the commercial sector at 
13% and the residential sector at 11%.
6    The total amount of coal produced for final consumption totaled 
roughly 500 million short tons of coal.
7 
The present situation is significantly different.  In 2000 the electricity production sector 
accounted for 91% of the total final consumption of coal.
8  The industrial sector accounted for 8% of 
total final consumption, and the transportation, commercial and residential sectors were all below 0.5%.
9  
Total final consumption of coal has increased more than two fold since 1949 to 1.3 billion short tons in 
2000.
10   
The following chart shows a comparison between the 1949 and 2000 breakdown of final 
consumption of coal by sector. 
 
Sector  1949  2000  Change in % from 1949 
Electricity 17%  91%  +74% 
Industrial 44%  8%  -36% 
Residential 11%  0.5%  -10.5% 
Commercial 13%  0.5%  -12.5% 
Transportation 15%  0.5%  -14.5% 
Total coal cons
11 500  mst  1.3  bst  +160% 
Coal as a Source of Production for Electricity in the US 
 
                                                        
4  Annual Energy Report 2001 (hereon referred to as AER 2001) Coal 
5  ANR 2001 Coal   
6  ANR 2001 Coal 
7  ANR 2001 Coal 
8  ANR 2001 Coal 
9  ANR 2001 Coal 
10 Coal  Industry  Annual  2001 
11  Total coal consumption, mst=million short tons bst=billion short tons 59 
While the situation of total final consumption of coal has changed dramatically, the situation of 
coal’s market share as a source of electricity production has remained relatively constant, as coal has 
managed to maintain its large market share as a source of energy used for electricity production.  Coal 
has been and continues to be the dominant source of fuel for electricity production in the US.     
 
From 1949 through 2000 coal has averaged a 51.1% market share as a source of electricity 
production.
12    As can be seen in the chart, only for the 1970’s, which were highlighted by environmental 
laws coming into effect and “great expectations” of nuclear power, did coal average less than a 50% 
market share of electricity production.
13 In fact except for the period between 1969-1979 coal has had 
over a 50% market share every year from 1949 through 2000.
14  During the same period hydropower 
has seen a gradual decrease in market share due to overall growth of the electricity market.  Oil, after 
peaking in the mid 1970s has seen its market share reduced to all time low levels.  As for natural gas, 
market share increased until the mid 1970s where upon market share was reduced and continued on a 
decreasing trend until during the 1990s when this trend was reversed.
15  Nuclear energy is the only major 
source of electricity production to significantly increase its market share.   
 
  1949-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2000 1949-2000 
Coal  51.0% 52.5% 45.3% 54.6% 52.0% 51.1% 
Gas    17.0% 21.8% 17.7% 12.2% 13.8% 16.5% 
Hydro 24.5% 18.5% 14.6% 11.6% 8.9%  15.5% 
Nuclear 0.0%  0.5%  7.1%  14.9%  19.4%  8.7% 
Oil  7.4% 6.7% 15.2%  6.3% 3.2% 7.6% 
 
Coal has maintained its market share under the background of an explosion in the electricity 
                                                        
12 AER  2001  Coal 
13 AER  2001  Electricity 
14 AER  2001  Coal 
15  expected to do so statement based on plans for future gas powered plants which dominant type of 
applications for power plants 60 
market, as since 1949 the US the electricity market
16  has increased over 14 fold (through 2001).
17 Total 
electricity end use in 1949 was 254,511,334 thousand kilowatt hours, and in 2001 it increased to 
3,396,763,520 thousand kilowatt hours.
18    During the period of 1949-2001 electricity growth has had an 
average year-on-year increase of 5.3%.
19  Coal use for electricity generation
20 increased at almost the 
same pace, averaging a 5.0% year-on-year increase during the same period.
21  Coal used for electricity 
generation shows a close correlation to growth of the electricity market.  It is this growth that has 
allowed coal to keep its high market share of the sources of electricity market.   
 
For comparison, over the same period GDP had an average year-on-year increase of 3.6%
22, 
year-on-year average household growth in the US was 1.7%
23 and average year-on-year population 
growth was 1.2%.















Population  1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 
Household  2.1% 1.8% 2.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.7% 
GDP  4.2% 4.4% 3.3% 3.0% 3.0% 3.6% 
Electricity  9.9% 7.4% 4.7% 2.9% 2.4% 5.3% 
Coal
25  for 
Electricity 
7.4% 6.3% 5.5% 3.9% 1.9% 5.0% 
Coal
26  -1.9%  3.0% 2.9% 2.8% 1.8% 1.6% 
(for reference purposes numerical data is included in the chart below) 
 
                                                        
16  defined in terms of total retail sales and direct use 
17 AER  2001  Electricity 
18 AER  2001  Electricity 
19  year on year percentage change, calculated with data from ANR 2001 
20  not overall coal use, coal used exclusively for electricity production 
21 AER  2001  Electricity 
22  GDP data was calculated using 1996 chained dollars ANR 2001 
23  US Census Bureau CPS http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html 
24  US Census Bureau CPS 
25  year on year change in Coal used for electricity only ANR 2001 Coal 





59 69  79  89  2000 
Population
27 149,188 177,829 202,676  225,055  246,819  290,368
28 
Households
29 42,182  51,435  62,214  77,330  92,830  104,705 
GDP
30 1550.9  2319  3571.4  4912.1  6591.8  9224 
Electricity
31 254,511 646,887 1,313,833  2,071,099  2,754,980  3,604,815 
Coal
32  for 
Electricity 
83,963 168,423  310,640  527,051  767,378  967,079 
Coal
33 483,237  385,062  516,413  680,542  894,999  1,084,094 
 
(causes of increase in electricity could cover another paper in itself and will not be further addressed in 
this paper)   
 
Reason 2: Failure of nuclear energy, coal’s major competitor 
 
With the emergence of the commercial nuclear energy sector in the 1960’s it seemed coal 
would be reduced to a minor role in the US energy scenario.  The beginning of the commercial atomic 
energy industry can be traced back to the 1954 Atomic Energy Amendment, which established a licensing 
procedure for parties interested in establishing private reactors.
34    The Atomic Energy Committee would 
now accept safety analyses from applicants, review the analyses and decide whether or not to issue 
construction permits. “The period from 1963 to 1975 became known as the Great Bandwagon Market, a 
term coined by Philip Sporn in 1967”.
35    As the nuclear industry gained momentum and expectations of 
nuclear energy being an inexhaustible supply of electricity increased, orders for plants and the number of 
permits issued also increased. As can be seen in the chart below, beginning with the middle of the 1960s 
                                                        
27  in thousands of people 
28  population clock, US Census home page 
29  in thousands of households 
30  in billions of 1996 chained US dollars,   
31  in million kilowatt hours 
32  in thousand short tons 
33  in thousand of short tons 
34  Atomic Energy Act of 1954 http://www.ametsoc.org/AMS/sloan/cleanair/cleanairlegisl.html 
35 http://nuclearhistory.tripod.com/nuclear_power.html 62 
to the end of the decade, orders and number of construction permits issued increased significantly. 
 
  1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Orders  1 0 2 4 0 7 20  29  16  9 
Construction 
Permits 
7 0 1 1 3 1 5 14  23  7 
 
In addition, in the early 1970’s orders for nuclear energy plants remained strong and the 
number of construction permits issued also remained strong up until 1978.  The following chart shows 
orders and construction permits for the 1970’s: 
 
  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Orders  14 21 38 42 28 4  3  4  2  0  0 
Construction 
Permits 
10  4 8 14  23  9 9 15  13  2 0 
 
Electricity from nuclear plants began to come on line, and by 1978 nuclear energy was 
producing 11.3% of US electricity.
36 
 
  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977  1978 
Nuclear  2.4% 3.1% 4.5% 6.1% 9.0% 9.4% 11.8%  12.5%  11.3%
 
The commercial nuclear energy industry came to a standstill on March 1979 as the worst 
nuclear accident in US history occurred at Three Mile Island.
37    This accident reinforced negative public 
sentiment towards nuclear power, and has left the US nuclear energy in a state of limbo.  Since 1978 
there has not been another order for nuclear plant and the last construction permit was granted in 1979.
38  
“In 1974 it had been projected that there would be 850-1400 nuclear plants in operation by the turn of the 
                                                        
36 AER  2001  Coal 
37  US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
38  US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 63 
century, there are currently 104.”
39  
  
With nuclear power in a state of limbo, coal again became the pillar of electricity generation in 
the US. 
 
Reason 3: Adaptation to environmental legislation 
 
The second major threat to the coal industry was rooted in environmental legislation. 
Environmental legislation of the second half of the 20
th century began with the 1955 Air Pollution 
Control Act.
40 This act centered on research of air quality standards, and was the first of three clean air 
acts 1955, 1963 and 1970.
41  This act was followed by the 1963 Clean Air Act that made inroads into 
attempting to control air pollution by setting emission standards.
42    “The 1970 Air Quality Standards Act 
was significant in that it set a national standard for emission standards for stationary sources.”
43  
 
The first major development of the 1970s was passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, which set 
“National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for seven pollutants—particulates, sulfur oxides, 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone hydrocarbons, and lead.
44  New Source Performance Standards, 
which strictly regulated emissions of a new source entering an area.    All new plants, or major additions 
to existing plants needed to adhere to New Source Performance Standards, in addition lowest achievable 
emissions rate (LAER), which is the lowest emissions rate achieved by a similar source in a SIP 
anywhere in the country, and a new source wishing to enter a PSD area needs to use the best achievable 
                                                        
39 http://www.ametsoc.org/AMS/sloan/cleanair/cleanairlegisl.html 
40  Air Pollution Control Act 1955 http://www.ametsoc.org/AMS/sloan/cleanair/cleanairlegisl.html 
41  Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 amendments in 1960, 1962 
42  Clean Air Act of 1963, amendments 1965,1966,1967(Air Quality Act, 1969 
43  1970 Clean Air Act excerpt http://www.ametsoc.org/AMS/sloan/cleanair/cleanairlegisl.html 
44  1970 Clean Air Act excerpt   64 
control technology BACT.”
45   
  
These laws were responsible for the beginning of a long term trend in which the coal industry 
began to combat emission standards by shifting to lower sulfur content coal located in mines West of 
Mississippi River.
46  As can be seen in the chart below, during the 1970s there was an average 
year-on-year increase of 21% in coal mined West of the Mississippi.   
 
  1949-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 1949-2001
West of Miss  -5.4  5.1  21.0  5.7  3.8  6.0 
East of Miss  -0.1  2.7  0.6  0.9  -0.9  0.6 
 
At the beginning of the decade coal produced from mines West of the Mississippi river 
accounted for 9% of produced coal.
47 By the end of the decade coal produced West of the Mississippi 
accounted for 30.3% of produced coal.
48  
 
  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
West %
49  9.1%  10.7 12.8 15.1 16.9 19.9 23.5 27.3 28.3 30.3 
 
The first major development of the 1990s was passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments by 
George Bush in 1990.  The 1990 CAAA was aimed at reducing SO2 NO2- but included no legislation 
on CO2- and requires electric utilities to reduce emissions of SO2 to 10 million tones below their 1980 
levels in 2 phases, before and after 2000.
50  “Allowances to emit SO2 were issued to cover actual 
emissions setting the basis for the only current emissions market in the world, SO2 emissions market.”
51   
                                                        
45  1970 Clean Air Act excerpt 
46 AER  2001  Coal 
47 AER  2001  Coal 
48 AER  2001  Coal 
49  % of total coal production originating West of the Mississippi 
50 CAAA 
51 IEA  report  32 65 
  “The two phase implementation schedule (2.5 lbs SO2 per million Btu emission limit by 
January 1, 1995, and Phase 2 requirements of 1.2 lbs SO2 per million Btu by January 1, 2000) allowed 
utilities to develop transition plans to achieve compliance on a system-wide basis.”  The CAAA 1990 
has played a large role in influencing the strategies of consumers and producers of coal.
52  “Strategies 
for meeting SO2 emissions include the following: fuel switching, co-firing or coal blending, installing 
flue gas scrubber systems, and purchasing or bundling SO2 emission credits.”
53 
 
The trend of coal produced West of the Mississippi gaining market share continued in the 
1990s as coal West of the Mississippi became the majority supplier of coal for the first time ever in 1998 
supplying 51.9% of coal total coal produced.  This trend is continuing as highly productive Western 
mines continue to take market share from the East. 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
%  of  west  41.0%  45.4 45.2 47.3 47.0 46.8 48.9 51.8 52.7 53.1 
 
Reason 4: Increased competitiveness 
 
At this point it may be appropriate to look at coal prices, which have been declining since the 
mid 1970s.  Coal prices declined after 1950, and then leveled off until the 1970s when a there was a 
sudden increase in prices due to the 1973 OPEC oil crisis.
54  After reaching a peak price in 1976 of 
46.32 US dollars per short ton,
55    coal prices began to decline, and in 2000 reached a price of 15.68 US 
dollars per short ton. 
56 
 
                                                        
52 lewis  5 
53 Lewis  Ronald 
54 AER  2001 
55 AER  2001  Coal 
56 chained  1996  dollars 66 
  1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Coal Prices
57  29.74 21.77 21.82 46.32 43.22 34.20 25.15 19.19 15.68 
 
Increases in productivity of the coal industry during the 1980s and 1990s have played a major role in 
lowering the prices of coal and increasing coal’s competitiveness. Increases in productivity were 
highlighted by the following trends: 
1)  shift to highly productive Western mines 
2)  closing of inefficient mines 
3)  increased mine size 
4)  consolidation of the coal mining industry 
5)  reduction of workers 
6)  equipment and technology improvements 
7)  change in purchasing structure 
 
1) Shift to highly productive Western mines 
 
Western coal reserves
58 are located near the surface and are more easily accessible than 
Eastern coal.    Western coal is predominantly mined using surface mining techniques.    From 1984-1989 
total productivity
59  of both regions East and West of the Mississippi showed an increase every year.    In 
fact, with the exception of a slight decline in productivity in underground mining West of the Mississippi 
in 1985, there was an increase in productivity each year for both surface and underground mining both 
East and West of the Mississippi. This is trend continued through the end of the century.    Although there 
were productivity increases both East and West of the Mississippi, it is apparent from the data below that 
Western mines are much more productive than their Eastern counterparts.    The biggest difference can be 
                                                        
57 dollars/short  ton 
58  defined by coal located west of the Mississippi River 
59  total productivity=avg of underground and surface mining productivity 67 
seen in a comparison between Western and Eastern surface mines as Western surface mines are almost 4 
times as productive as Eastern surface mines.   
 
East  of  Miss  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Underground  1.69 1.75 1.96 2.16 2.32 2.39 
Surface  2.56 2.52 2.75 2.97 2.99 3.13 
Total    1.98 2  2.21 2.42 2.54 2.63 
 
West of Miss  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Underground  2.49 2.45 2.8  3.39 3.55 3.92 
Surface  8.15 8.61 9.02 9.86 10.73  11.86 
Total   7.07  7.4  7.9  8.73  9.38  10.21 
 
The 1990s were similar to the 1980s in that productivity of both types of mines East and West 
of the Mississippi increased, but as can be seen by the data below Western mines are far more productive 
than their Eastern counterparts. The following charts shows worker productivity increases over the past 
decade in surface and underground mines from 1990-2000.
60  The most noticeable point is the 
extremely high productivity of western mines.   
 
East of Miss  1990 1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000
Underground  2.46 2.59 2.82 2.81 3.02 3.19 3.36 3.63 3.69 3.74 3.9 
Surface  3.32 3.49 3.61 3.74 3.85 4.03 4.25 4.49 4.31 4.48 4.84
Total    2.73 2.86 3.07 3.11 3.28 3.45 3.63 3.89 3.89 3.97 4.19
 
West of Miss  1990  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000
Underground  4.01 4.53 4.85 5.18 5.93 6.32 7.03 6.82 6.76 7.45 7.73 
Surface  12.26 12.36 12.49 13.94 15.19 16.23 17.89 18.63 18.82 19.57 20.06
Total    10.41 10.79 11.03 12.14 13.22 14.18 15.66 16.04 16.27 17.18 17.67
 
US total productivity increases can be directly correlated to the increase in coal produced West 
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of the Mississippi.  In 1949 coal West of the Mississippi accounted for just 6.4% of total production.
61 
In 1960, coal west of the Mississippi actually decreased to 5.2% of total production, and bottomed out at 
5.1% in 1966.
62 But by 1979 coal produced West of the Mississippi accounted for 30.3% of total coal 
produced.
63    During the 1980s market share of coal produced West of the Mississippi increased another 
10% to 40.6% by 1990.
64  
 
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
%  West  32.8%  32.7 35.1 34.4 36.8 36.6 36.7 39.0 38.9 38.8 40.6 
 
The trend of coal produced West of the Mississippi gaining market share continued in the 
1990s as coal West of the Mississippi became the major supplier of coal for the first time ever in 1998 
supplying 51.9% of coal total coal produced.  This trend has continued as the highly productive West 
continues to take market share from the East. 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
%  of  west  41.0%  45.4 45.2 47.3 47.0 46.8 48.9 51.8 52.7 53.1 
 
2) Elimination of inefficient mines 
 
  Another factor directly related to the increase in productivity is the closing of inefficient mines.   
From 1986 through 1997 the number of coal mines declined from 4,424 in 1986 to 1,453 in 2000 down 
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  1986 1991 1996 2000  91-2000  膓 Change 
No  Mines  4,424 3,022 1,903 1,453  -7.8% 
East of Miss    2,867  1,787  1,355  -8.0 
West of Miss    155  116  98  -5.0 
Source: Coal Industry Annual 2000 
 
  There has been a large drop in the number of mines since 1986, while at the same time coal 
production and productivity has continued to increase.
66  Since 1991 the majority of the mines closed 
were located East of the Mississippi, which is comparatively inferior to the West. In addition, Phase II of 
CAAA came into effect in January 2000 and has contributed to this trend as the market for high and 
moderate sulfur content coal, which is predominantly located in the East, is shrinking.
67  
 
3) Mine size 
 
  Strongly correlated with the closing of inefficient mines is the increase in mine size
68, as the 
percentage of coal produced from mines of at least 1 million short tons per year rose to 63.5% in 1990 
from 44.4% in 1980.
69    In 1997 the percent of coal produced by million-ton-plus coal mines accounted 
for 75.5% of US production.
70  In 2000 although the number of mines producing over 1 million or more 
short tons of coal decreased to 184 from 208 in 1997, the percentage share of total number of mines of 1 
million or more short tons of coal increased to 12.2% in 2000 from 11.4% in 1997. 
71 In addition, 
production (in million short tons) reached 854.7 million short tons, a 3.9% increase over the 1997 total of 
884.2 millions short tons in 1997 total, which resulted in the percentage of total production of tonnage 
increasing to 79.6% in 2000 from 75.5% in 1997.
72   
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4) Consolidation 
 
  Increased mine size is intern highly correlated with the further consolidation of the coal 
industry.  In 1990 the top ten coal producing companies
73 produced 383.4 million short tons of coal 
which accounted for 37% of total coal production.    By 1998 this total almost doubled increasing to 692 
million short tons of coal which accounted for 62% of total production.    This trend has continued as by 
2001 the top ten companies accounted for 68% of total coal production.    Peabody Energy Corporation is 
the best example of this as production has increased more than two fold over the past decade, increasing 
to 194.4 mst in 2001 up from 93.3 mst in 1990.   
 
Continued consolidation 
Producer 1990  mil/t  Producer 1998  mil/t  Producer  2001 
Peabody 93.3  Peabody  168.5 Peabody  194.4 
CONSOL  54.6  Arch Coal  105.4  Arch Coal  118.4 
Amax 44.0  Kennecott  102.6  Kennecott  117.5 
Exxon 30.7  CONSOL  74.3  CONSOL  73.7 
Texas Utilities  30.6  Cyprus-Amax(RAG)  70.3  RAG  65.6 
ARCO 29.4 AEI  Resources  51.0    
NERCO 28.7  Massey  37.9     
Shell Mining  24.6  North America  31.6     
Sun Coal    24.1  Texas Utilities  28.3     
Arch Mineral  23.4  Pacific Corp  22.1     
Total 383.4  Total  692.0     
* 37%  *  62%    68% 
* Represents percent of total US coal production mined by the top ten companies
74 
 
Another example of consolidation can be seen in the Southern Powder River Basin located in highly 
productive Wyoming, where 93% of current output is controlled by four mining companies, through 12 
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operations, 2 by Arch Coal Inc., 2 by Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 4 by Kennecott Energy Co., and 4 by 
the Peabody Group, which total 271.9 million tons of coal in 1998.
75   
 
Company  No. of operations  1998 (m of t)  % of SPRB 
Arch Coal Inc.  2  49.8  17.0 
Cyprus Amax Min Co. 2  40.6  13.8 
Kennecott Energy Co.  4  85.6  29.2 
The Peabody Group  4  95.9  32.7 
Total 12  271.9  92.7 
 
5) Reduction of workers 
 
Employment in the coal industry has been in a declining trend since the 1980s, while at the 
same time productivity continues to rise.  The US coal industry average annual percent change of total 
employment from 1991-2000 was -5.6%,    East of the Mississippi averaged -6.7% over the ten year span, 
while West of the Mississippi averaged -.2% over the same period.
76  
 
In 1990 the total number of workers in the coal industry was 120,602.
77  In 2000 the total 
number of workers in the mining industry was 71,522, down 40% from its 1991 level. The number of 
workers East of the Mississippi was 56,124 in 2000 down 47% compared with 1990 levels, and West of 
the Mississippi was 15,398 2% lower than 1990 levels.
78    Over the same period total productivity is up 
almost  75%.   
 
  The following chart exhibits how productive Western mines are as Western mines produce 
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more coal than Eastern mines with 1257 less mines, and 40,726 workers.
79  A closer look at Western 
mines reveals the remarkable productivity of Wyoming surface mines.    Wyoming surface mines in 2000 
accounted for 31.5% of total coal production in 2000, utilizing just 20 mines (surface) or 1.4% of US 
mines.
80  In addition, the Wyoming coal industry employment has gone against the industry trend and 
has actually added 1,276 workers since 1991 up 41.9%, while at the same time increasing productivity 
from 23.11 short tons per mining hour in 1991 to 38.60 in 2000. 
 






East of Miss  56,124  507,517  4.19  1355 




4,319 337,691  38.60 20 
Total 71,522  1,073,612  7.02  1,453 
 






East of Miss  104,907  591,294  2.86  2,867 




3,043   23.11  
Total  120,602 995,984 4.09  3,022 
   
6) Equipment and technology improvements 
  
Underground techniques, include long wall techniques, helped to increase productivity 
significantly.  For surface mines larger, more efficient equipment, automation, computerization and 
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satellite mapping have all helped to increase productivity. In addition enhanced management skills 
including, planning, communication and information flow all helped to increase productivity. 
 
7) Change in purchasing structure 
 
During the 1970’s and 1980’s many US utilities signed long term of coal contracts for periods 
of 20-30 years at fixed prices with coal producers, which did not take into account the advancements in 
technology and other future market changes.   The result was locked prices well above market prices as 
coal prices began to decrease in the 1980’s.  “Over the last decade, 1990s, the policy of acquiring coal 
with short-term contracts ranging from 1 to 3 years has become increasingly popular.    The 1990 strategy 
for coal to purchase coal through short-term contracts with the difference made up with purchases on the 
spot market, 1-6 months.”
85 
 
  This is exemplified in the following example of the Powder River Basin in Wyoming, which 
reveals the shift toward open market purchases.  From 1990 to 1998 the amount of coal purchased 
through spot purchases was up 119%, and the amount of coal purchased by 5 year or less contracts in 
1998 was up 347%. At the same time the amount of coal purchased through contracts of 5 years or more 
was down 23% from 1990 levels. 
 
  Public Utility Sales tons-millions 
Type of Sale
86 1990  1998 
Spot 26.9
87 58.8 
5yr of less Contract  38.7  173 
Greater than 5-yr term  129.6  99.3 
Total 195.2  331.1 
% Contract Sales Tonnages Greater Than 5-yr  77.0  36.5 
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  Ronald Lewis described the coal industry with the following terms at the 1
st US International 
Coal Conference in Washington, D.C. on June 12, 2000. 
“Coal Industry characteristics, stagnant coal prices, decreased earnings, despite increased productivity, 




In spite of this, coal is forecast to continue to maintain a large market share as a source of 
electricity.    Although coal share’s of electricity generation is expected to drop from 51% in 1999 to 45% 
in 2020
89, there are signs that coal may not lose market share after all.   
 
  First nuclear energy is in a state of limbo, with the reasons behind this including strong public 
opposition to nuclear energy, which has stopped development of new facilities and all increases in 
nuclear energy have come from increased capacity.
90  Nuclear capacity, no new plants being built, and 
assuming nuclear plants are retired after 30, 40 or 50 years.    If operating costs exceed the coast of power 
from replacement capacity.    Result in retirement of 9.7 gigawatts of nuclear capacity.     
 
Second, doubts over new emerging competitors.  Market share of electricity generation of 
natural gas is expected to increase from 15% to 32%, but this is growth is expected to only slightly 
reduce coal’s market share.    In addition, sharp increases in natural gas prices at the end of the 1990s, has 
questioned the stability of natural gas prices.  Renewable energy is expected to grow, but not to an 
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adequate level to reduce coal’s market share.
91  The same can be said for nuclear energy, which is 
forecast to lose market share as electricity production from nuclear energy is expected to remain constant 
over the next 20 years.     
 
Without the emergence of a stable competitor or environmental legislation dealing with CO2, it 
seems coal will be able to maintain a large market share of the US electricity production market.   
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荊莊荴荈莋荪荁轂苌鏬覈諝釥譃躿談鞝诇腩South Coast Air Quality Management District: 
SCAQMD腪芪軀蹻芵芽 RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苍腃芻苌邬賷韡苌裪苂苆芵苄讓芰苧苪苄芢苩腄80 










靶邿芵芽腄花苪苍腃鍤韍觯軐苌銂酦蹟覻閨鑲软負腩NOx RECLAIM Trading Credits:  裈覺腃NOx 
RTCs腪苉野芷苩軹靶苰譽醝芳芹腃艑艏艏艏鑎苌 NO芘 RTCs 苌覿詩芪艐艘艘艘鑎苉铤苗苄苙苚
艐艏鑻苠銵苋迣芪苩苆芢芤躖釔苰辵芢苄芵苜苁芽腄 












ₓ袊?譃躿談鞝诇苍腃 South Coast Air Basin 腩芢苭苤苩莍荔莓荛莋荘陾鉮腪 譹苑 Salton Sea Air 

























腩California Air Resource Board: CARB腪譹苑 EPA 芪鉓鎖芵苄芢苩腄 
₂놂첂苈賀詅芪芠苩苠苌苌腃鏬覈諝釥譃躿談鞝诇苍釥譃諂讫諮辀苰鉂邬芷苩芽苟苉靬腘苈
邭跴苰軀蹻芷苩轤靶苈赳邭酧遄苅芠苨腃花苌譀論苌軥苈邭跴軨鉩苍腵釥譃躿談鞝豶触腶 腩Air 




























芽苟苌酛鉵苅芠苁芽苆赬芦苧苪苩腄 芻苌貋觊腃 艐艘艘艓鑎苌辉諺鑺閪苍鎯鑎苌 NOx 鑲软韊苌軀





  辉諺鑺閪 




Utility 9,401 1,744 81%  5,306  67% 
Refinery 13,888  4,596 67%  8,914  48% 
Other 18,139  6,055  67%  11,094  45% 
Total 41,428  12,395  70%  25,314  51% 
软辊腆White Paper on Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices, SCAQMD, 2001. 
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软辊腆White Paper on Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices, SCAQMD, 2001. 
 
 
遽艑腼艑腆SOx RTC 苌辉諺鑺閪苆 SOx 鑲软韊苌軀郑 

























































































RTC 苍 RECLAIM Trading Credits 苌鞪質苅腃艐鉐裊苌 RTC 苍靌賸鑎鍸苉鎖詙覘郵閨躿苰艐荼
莓荨鑲软芷苩讖观还苌苦芤苈苠苌苅芠苩腄RTC 苌軭韞苉苍腃芻苪芼苪 NOx RTC 苆 SOx RTC 芪
芠苩腄花苪苍腃陀鍉苉誮酓苉闛迡芳苪苩跠蹙負苅苍苈芭腃鏬覈諝釥譃躿談鞝诇苍腃迪趇苉苦苁
苄苍腃花苪苧苌讖观苰軦苨迁芷花苆芪苅芫苩腄RTC 苍艐鑎諔靌賸苅芠苨腃RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉
莀苉蹑见芷苩諩识苍鎖詙鑎鍸苌鑲软軀郑苆鎯韊苌 RTC 苰闛靌芵苈芯苪苎苈苧苈芢腄 
RTC 苉苍鏱軭韞芪芠苁苄腃裪苂苍艐貎芩苧艐艑貎苜苅靌賸苈 RTC腩calendar year RTC腪苆腃
苠芤裪苂苍腃艖貎芩苧躟鑎鍸苌艕貎苜苅靌賸苈 RTC腩fiscal year RTC腪苅芠苩腄鏱苂苌荞荃荶苌
RTC 苍腃蹑见諩识苉莉莓荟莀苉鑺閪芳苪苩腄花苌苦芤苉鏱苂苌 RTC 苰靰裓芵芽苌苍腃譽貃苈
RTC 覿詩苌闏鎮苰陨芮芽苟苅芠苩腄 RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苍 RTC 苌药莓荌莓荏邧鍸苰郝芯苄芢
苈芢腄芵芽芪苁苄腃RTC 苍靌賸諺賀芪觟芬苩苆芻苌賸韍苠鎯躞苉迁雅芷苩腄苠芵裪躞鍟苅芷苗
苄苌 RTC 芪迁雅芵苄芵苜芤苆腃RTC 苌覿詩芪譽鎫芷苩芨芻苪芪芠苨腃苜芽腃RTC 苌軦裸蹳迪














软辊腆White Paper on Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices, SCAQMD, 2001. 
 
蹑见諩识苍腃辅軧鑎鍸苌鑲软韊苰鏬覈諝釥譃躿談鞝诇苉躩軥鍉苉闱趐芵苈芯苪苎苈苧苈芢腄
釥譋雍苈鑲软貹苍顁醱鍉鑲软莂荪荞莊莓荏荖荘荥莀腩continuous emission monitoring system: 





RTC 鑲软顧芩苧趷芵裸芩苪苩腄 苈芨腃 裡钽芵芽艐鏺鎖芽苨跅趂艔艏艏荨莋苌钱诠芪览芹苧苪苩腄  
RTC 苌軦裸苉苍鉎苅苠蹑见苅芫苩腄苜芽腃軦裸苰襾誊苉赳苈苭芹苩芽苟苉腃鏬覈諝釥譃躿談
鞝诇苉苦苩軦裸苌躖酏辳鑆苍镳靶苅芠苩腄芽芾芵腃軦裸苰赳苈苁芽起钃軒譹苑铌钄軒苍腃軦裸
† 7/1/99    1/1/00     7/1/00     1/1/01    7/1/01     1/1/02 
Cycle 2 Credits(1999) 
Cycle 1 Credits(2000) 
Cycle 2 Credits(2000) 87 
苌鏠靥苰鎖诇苉闱趐芷苩譠隱苍芠苩腄花苪苧苌軦裸苌鏠雳苍腃鏬覈諝釥譃躿談鞝诇苌荺腛莀荹


































釦艒郟 RTC Market 
 
艐腄NOx RTC 覿詩苌譽貃苈迣辸 
 
遽艑腼艐芪躦芷苦芤苉腃艐艘艘艓鑎苌 NOx RTC 苌辉諺鑺閪苍軀跛苌 NOx 鑲软韊苰釥閝苉迣
觱苁苄芢芽腄花苪苍 NOx RTC 苌讟讋芪軹靶苰釥芫芭迣觱苩花苆苰裓隡芵腃芻苌貋觊腃艐艘艘
艓鑎芩苧艐艘艘艘鑎苜苅苌諔苅苍腃NOx RTC 覿詩苍铱迭苉裀鋨芵苄芢芽腄艐艘艘艓鑎芩苧艐艘
艘艖鑎苜苅苌閽诏覿詩苍艐荧莓鎖芽苨艔艏艏荨莋裈覺苅芠苁芽腄花苌苦芤苈蹳迪述貏覺苅腃荶
莍荏莉莀苉蹑见芵芽諩识苉苆苁苄苍腃 腵NOx RTC 苌起鏼苉苦苩辅軧腶苆芢芤辅軧軨鉩芪跅苠裀
迣芪苨苌闻陀苅芠苨腃 軀跛腃 鍤韍觯軐苢郎電觯軐苍 NOx 鑲软韊苰跭貸芷苩芽苟苌鎊躑苰釓苁苄
芫芽苌苅芠苩腄 
芵芩芵腃NOx RTC 苌讟讋韊苍艑艏艏艒鑎苜苅苉苍隈鑎貸辭芵苂苃芯苩蹤酧苝苉苈苁苄芨苨腃
遽艑腼艐芪躦芷苦芤苉腃艐艘艘艘鑎苉苍腃NOx 鑲软韊芪 NOx RTC 苌讟讋韊苰迣觱苩腃芢苭苤
苩腵荎莍荘草腛药腛腅荼荃莓荧腶 腩crossover point腪苉鎞鉂芵腃NOx RTC 苌讟讋韊芪 NOx 鑲软韊
苰覺觱苩苦芤苈軹讋镎钗苌迳釔苉諗苁苄芵苜苁芽腄芳苧苉腃艑艏艏艏鑎规苉苍腃荊莊荴荈莋荪89 




雅芷苩艐艘艘艘鑎荔荃荎莋艑苌 NOx RTC 苌覿詩苉苂芢苄苝苩苆腃艐艘艘艘鑎苌閽诏覿詩芪艐
荧莓鎖芽苨艐郧艗艑艖荨莋芾苁芽苌芪腃艑艏艏艏鑎苉苍腃艐障艔郧艒艖艖襾苉軦裸芳苪腃苙苚
艐艏鑻苌鉬迣芪苨苰販芹苄芢芽腄艑艏艏艏鑎艐艑貎苉迁雅芷苩艑艏艏艏鑎荔荃荎莋艐苌 NOx 

































软辊腆White Paper on Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices, SCAQMD, 2001. 90 
艑腄鑲软跭貸鍷韍苌镳醫 
 
₍ꆉ첋貃苈鉬迣芪苨苌軥苈貴裶苍腃貾芤苜苅苠苈芭腃 NOx RTC 苉野芷苩銴觟軹靶苌醶距苅
芠苁芽腄軀跛腃RTC 蹳迪苉芨芯苩軦裸苍辇銲苅芠苁芽苆镝覿芳苪苄芢苩腄艐艘艘艓鑎芩苧艑艏
艏艏鑎苜苅苌 NOx RTC 苌軦裸醍詺苍艑覭艕郧障荨莋苅腃雱艑艗障艔郧荧莓苌 RTC 芪軦裸芳苪
芽腄軦裸苌釥钼腩雱艑艐障荧莓腪苍酧遄鏠閔苉芨芯苩裚鍝腩覿詩苈芵腪苅芠苁芽芪腃苉苠芩芩




讟讋苍腃艐艘艘艐鑎苌 AQMP 苉躦芳苪苄芢苩 NOx 鑲软跭貸雚镗苉趇苭芹苄芷苅苉腵辉諺鑺閪
芳苪芽 RTC腶 苆裚鎮鑲软貹苢雊鑲软貹苌鑲软跭貸閪芩苧 腵鍝誷芳苪苩 RTC腶 苆苌鏱軭韞芪芠苩腄
酏軒苍芷苅苉讟讋韊芪詭鋨芳苪苄芨苨腃軡誱苌鋇见鑺閪苌观鑜邫苍蹣苁苄芢苩苠苌苌腃芻苌讟
讋韊苍辭韊苉觟芬芸腃花苪裈迣苌釥閝苈讟讋醝见苍諺釒苅芫苈芢腄 
鑲软跭貸荎莌荗荢荧 腩MSERCs, ASCs腪 苌 RTC 苖苌鍝誷苍苇芤芾苁芽芾苫芤芩腄 镜艒腼艐苍腃
艐艘艘艓鑎芩苧艑艏艏艑鑎苜苅苌迳讵苰躦芵苄芢苩腄花苌镜芩苧苠閪芩苩苦芤苉腃花苌闻陀苉
苦苩 RTC 苌讟讋韊苍芩苈苨賀苧苪芽苠苌苉觟芬苈芢腄RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苌詏芩苧鎾苧苪苩
鑲软跭貸苰鞘靰芷苩芽苟苉苍腃 EPA苢CARB苌苦芤苈醼苌談鞝鎖诇苌讦韍芪镋靶镳观貇苅芠苨腃









镜艒腼艐腆NOx RTC 苖苌鍝誷軀郑 
鑎  鍝誷(荧莓)  鍝誷貳 
1994  33  Rule 1610 (Old Vehicle Scrapping) 
1995  36  Rule 1610 (Old Vehicle Scrapping) 
1996  36  Rule 1610 (Old Vehicle Scrapping) 
1997  4  Rule 1610 (Old Vehicle Scrapping) 
1999  50  Rule 1612 (Credits for Clean On-road Vehicles) 
2000  150  Rule 1612 (Credits for Clean On-road Vehicles) 
2000  68  Rule 2506 (Area Source Credits for NOx and SOx) 
2001  10  Rule 1612 (Credits for Clean On-road Vehicles) 
2001  68  Rule 2506 (Area Source Credits for NOx and SOx) 
2002  68  Rule 2506 (Area Source Credits for NOx and SOx) 







遽艒腼艑苍 NOx 鑲软韊苌鎮購苰苦苨迚芵芭躦芵芽苠苌苅芠苩腄 花苌遽苍腃 艑艏艏艏鑎裈酏苜
苅苉角鎮苰銆蹾芵芽蹻郝苰辜芢芽蹻郝芩苧苌鑲软韊苌鎮購苅芠苩芪腃花苌遽芩苧难苧芩苈苦芤




遽艒腼艑腆RECLAIM 蹻郝芩苧苌 NOx 鑲软鎮購 
软辊腆White Paper on Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices, SCAQMD, 2001. 
 
芻苪苅苍腃銴觟軹靶苌譋雍苍裪里苇苌鋶鍸芾苁芽苌芩腄镜艒腼艑苍艐艘艘艘鑎苌鑲软軀郑苆


































Other over 10 tons
Electric utility
Other under 10 tons93 
镜艒腼艑腆NOx RTC 苌銴觟軹靶 
鑲软韊 RTC 闛靌韊(跭貸镋靶铤鞦膓腪 
蹙识详閪 
1999 2001 2002  2003 
鍤韍 5,512  2,798(43)  2,777(50)  2,065(63) 
郎電 8,847  5,861(34)  5,203(41)  4,927(44) 
芻苌醼(艐艏荧莓裈迣腪 5,911  5,335(10) 5,106(14)  4,446(25) 
芻苌醼(艐艏荧莓隢隞腪 644  501(22)  458(29)  411(36) 
RECLAIM 蹻郝裈詏 0  656  362  546 
醍豶 20,914  15,151(28)  13,906(34)  12,395(41) 














艒腄艑艏艏艏鑎苉芨芯苩 RTC 軦裸 
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芪腃RTC 苌軹讋芪镎钗芷苩銆苅腃RTC 苰隳趷闊苉钃芢軦苨腃蹳迪苉软觱苩 RTC 芪譽貃苉貸辭
芵芽花苆苅芠苩腄芻苌貋觊腃鍤韍苆郎電蹙识苌 RTC 闛靌韊苍辉諺鑺閪顧苰釥芫芭迣觱苩苦芤苉


















































































離裏裵觯苉苍腃RECLAIM 苉蹑见芷苩靬腘苈諩识腩艐艏艏軐裈迣腪 腃RTC 苌軦裸苉芩芩苭苩酧遄
苢荵莍腛荊腃諂讫闛賬鉣里苌釣镜腩艒鉣里腪 腃闄趑諂讫闛賬銡腩EPA腪 腃荊莊荴荈莋荪荁轂釥譃
躑貹談鞝诇腩CARB腪 腃荊莊荴荈莋荪荁轂荇荬莋荍腛裏裵觯腩CEC腪苌釣镜苧芪蹑见芵腃花苌迪




腩MSERCs, ASCs腪苰 RTC 苉闏誷芷苩荶莍荚荘苰训覻芷苩 
 
₂뮂苠 RECLAIM 邧鍸苍 MSERCs 譹苑 ASCs 苰 RTC 苉闏誷芷苩莋腛莋苰铵芦苄芢芽芪腃
軀跛苉腃蹑见諩识苍花苪苧苌荎莌荗荢荧苌鞘靰苰芵苄芫芽腄花苪苉苍腃RECLAIM 苌荎莌
荗荢荧闏誷莋腛莋芪轂邭镻苢 EPA 苉苦苁苄邳躮苉鑆鋨芳苪苄芢苈芩苁芽苆芢芤躖迮芪芠苁芽腄
裚鎮鑲软貹芩苧苌荎莌荗荢荧苰鞘靰芵苄 RECLAIM 苌鑲软譋邧苰辅軧芵苄苠腃EPA 芪芻苪苰鑆
苟苈芢观鑜邫芪蹣苁苄芢芽芵腃苜芽腃諂讫闛賬鉣里芩苧趐酩芳苪苩諫貯苠芠苁芽芩苧苅芠苩腄
花苌苦芤苈陀鍉镳裀鋨邫苰苈芭芷芽苟苉腃轂邭镻苍闏誷莋腛莋苰轂軀赳豶触腩State 
Implementation Plan: SIP腪苌裪閔苆芵苄芫芿英苆裊鉵镴芯苩苆苆苠苉腃EPA 芪花苌豶触苰辳鑆芷
苩苆芢芤荶莍荚荘芪镋靶苅芠苨腃花苌荶莍荚荘苰鋊芶苄腃闏誷芳苪苩 RTC 苌陀鍉鉮裊苰詭鞧芷
苩花苆芪讁苟苧苪芽腄 
₂놂첂苈酛鉵苍 RTC 苌讟讋苰醝苢芵覿詩苰裀鋨芳芹苩賸觊芪芠苩苆諺釒芳苪苩腄 花苌荜腛
荘芩苧鎾苧苪苩 RTC 苌讟讋韊苍辬譋雍苌苠苌苉觟芬苈芢芪腩镜艒腼艐蹑迆腪 腃花苌荜腛荘苍覿
詩苰裀鋨芳芹苩芽苟苌譍轤苈讟讋貹苅芠苨腃花苌荜腛荘苰郏诉鍉苉誈靰芷苩花苆苍貾芤苜苅苠
苈芭轤靶苅芠苩腄 97 
₂鍉苉販苩苆腃 AQMD Governing Board 苍腃 艑艏艏艐鑎艒貎艐艕鏺苉腃 Rule  艐艕艐艑腄




苪苧苌荶莍荏莉莀苉苦苁苄鉂邬芳苪芽鑲软跭貸苍 RECLAIM Reserve 苉荶腛莋芳苪苩芩腃 銼郚苉
RECLAIM 諩识芪譋邧苌辅軧苉鞘靰芷苩花苆芪苅芫苩腄 
 






讟讋苌裀酓邫芪詭闛芳苪苩花苆苰 AQMD 苌 Governing Board 芪辳鑆芵芽迣苅腃RECLAIM 荶莍
荏莉莀苉閜譁芷苩花苆苆苈苁苄芢苩腄芵芽芪苁苄腃鑲辜芳苪芽釥豞钭鍤蹻郝苍腃辉諺苉鑺閪芳
苪芽 RTC 譹苑艑艏艏艐鑎艐貎艐艐鏺裈酏苉起鏼芵芽 RTC 裈詏苌 RTC 苍鑲软譋邧苌辅軧苌芽苟
苉靰芢苩花苆芪苅芫苈芢腄苜芸腃花苪苧苌蹻郝芪辅軧苌芽苟苉起鏼苅芫苩荎莌荗荢荧苍腃躩軐
鏠苌醼苌鑲软貹芪闛靌芷苩 RTC 苆 MSERC 苈苇苉賀鋨芳苪苩腄芵芩芵腃花苪苧苌蹻郝苍闛靌芷
苩 RTC 苰談鞝鎖诇苉铌钄芷苩花苆苍观鑜苅芠苩 腩艐荼莓荨鎖芽苨艖腄 艔艏荨莋裈覺苌覿詩苅腪 腄 
₂?북䎔辜芳苪芽釥豞钭鍤蹻郝苉野芵苄苍腃鑲软靽邧蹻郝苌郝鉵豶触苌鋱软苰讁苟腃醬苢芩
苈鑲软跭貸苰鉂邬芷苩苦芤靕鎱芷苩腄 鑲软跭貸苰鉂邬芷苩芽苟苉腃 談鞝鎖诇苍腃 醁醬苌 BARCT




























艓腄RECLAIM Air Quality Investment Program (AQIP) 
 




蹳迪苅赐迭鍉苈 RTC 苌起鏼軒苆芵苄費苪苩裪閔苌諩识腩structural buyers腪苢遖譋苉貚郝芳苪苩
钭鍤辊苰野进苉芷苩荶莍荏莉莀苅芠苩腄 AQIP 苰辅軧軨鉩苆芵苄鞘靰苅芫苩諩识苍腃 遖譋蹻郝腃
芠苩芢苍腃辬譋雍蹻郝苅跅鋡賀 BARCT 苌蹻郝苰铵芦苄芢苩蹻郝苅芠苨腃鋇见鍉苈鑲软跭貸苌
賀詅铯靰芪铤該鍉苉趂芢蹻郝苅芠苩腄 
花苪苧苌諩识苍迭苉 RTC 苌軹靶軒苅芠苩芩苧腃 花苪苧苌諩识苌軹靶苰蹳迪芩苧軦苨辜芭花苆
苍腃 RTC 覿詩苌裀鋨覻苰遽苩迣苅裓譠苰苠苂腄 蹳迪芩苧花苪苧苌諩识苰軦苨辜芭芽苟苉腃 AQMD
苍花苪苧苌諩识芪 RTC 苉鞊苧苈芭苄苠譋邧苰荎莊荁芷苩鎹苰靰裓芵芽腄芷苈苭芿腃闛靌芷苩
RTC 苰銴觟芷苩 NOx 鑲软韊艐荼莓荨鎖芽苨艖.艔艏荨莋(艐荧莓鎖芽苨艐障艔郧荨莋)苰 AQMD
苉蹸閥芦苎腃譋邧苰荎莊荁芵芽花苆苉苝苈芳苪苩苌苅芠苩腄花苪苧苌躑诠苍 AQIP 苰軀蹻芷苩
芽苟苌荴荀莓荨苰豠邬芵腃賅鋨鑲软貹腃雊鑲软貹腃裚鎮鑲软貹芪 NOx 苰跭貸芷苩芽苟苌鎊躑誈
鎮苖苌蹸覇诠苆芵苄靰芢苧苪苩腄 鑲软跭貸芪 RECLAIM 苉蹑见芵苈芢鑲软貹芩苧鎾苧苪芽迪趇腃
花苪苧苌跭貸苍 RTC 苉闏誷芳苪腃RTC 苌讟讋韊苰醝苢芷花苆苉豱芪苩腄躐離裏裵觯苉蹑见芵
芽芷苗苄苌諂讫鉣里苍腃花苌苦芤苈荎莌荗荢荧讟讋韊苰醝苢芷野跴苉苍训芭钽野芵芽腄 
₂傃粃鎃鎖芽苨艖 .艔艏荨莋苍腃軀跛苌跭貸铯靰苦苨趂苟苌鞿鞦苅芠苩苆芢苭苪苄芢苩腄艑艏
艏艏鑎苌 AQMD 苌譚轰镝覿苉苦苩苆腃花苪苦苨鋡芢铯靰苅 NOx 苰跭貸苅芫苩譚轰芪軀跛醶距
芵苄芢芽苆镝覿芳苪苄芢苩芩苧苅芠苩腄芾芩苧腃RTC 苉裋醶芵苄苎芩苨芢苩諩识苍軡誱趂苟苌
鞿鞦苅铯靰苰閥芢腃AQMD 苍芻苌躑诠苰 NOx 跭貸荶莍荗荆荎荧苉鍋郘苉鑺閪芷苩花苆苉苦苁
苄腃铯靰賸觊鍉苈跭貸苰軀蹻芷苩腃苆芢苁芽蹤酧苝苅芠苩腄 









苆芳苪苄芢苩腄芷苈苭芿腃AQMD 芪 RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苌铍裍詏苌苆花苫苅 NOx 鑲软韊苰
跭貸芵芽賣腃花苌跭貸閪苰 AQIP 苌鍋靰苰軳芯苩諩识芪譋邧苌辅軧苉靰芢苩蹤酧苝苅芠苩腄芾
























































苌遖譋苌 RTC 讟讋韊苰醝苢芷芩苉轗銆芵苄芢苩腄韡芦苎腃 腵闯誇鍉荎莌荗荢荧軦裸邧鍸腶
腩Universal Trading Credits Program: UTC腪苌鎱鏼苍芻苌鍔豞鍉躖韡苅芠苩腄花苪苍腃RECLAIM
荶莍荏莉莀芪軀蹻芷苩 RTC 蹳迪苰醼苌荶莍荏莉莀苆莊莓荎芳芹苩花苆苉苦苁苄腃RTC 芾芯苅
苈芭 ERCs 苢 NOx 裈詏苌覘郵閨躿苆論豗芷苩荎莌荗荢荧腩韡芦苎腃VOC ERCs腪苌鞘靰苰观鑜
苉芷苩腃RTC 蹳迪苌詧釥郭鞪苅芠苩腄RTC 蹳迪苰 RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苉蹑见芷苩諩识苉賀鋨
芹芸腃醼苌靬腘苈鑲软貹苌誈鎮芩苧鎾苧苪苩荎莌荗荢荧苉苜苅詧釥芷苩花苆苍腃鎖酒腃蹳迪苖
苌荎莌荗荢荧苌讟讋苰醝苢芷花苆苉苈苨腃 RTC 苌覿詩裀鋨覻苉赶貣芷苩腄 芵芩芵腃 花苌邭跴苍腃
RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苉蹑见芷苩諩识芪閉芤苗芫跭貸郓鑃苰醼苌荏莋腛荶苉鍝觅芷苩賸觊苰躝
芿腃諂讫鉣里苢 EPA 苈苇苌钽钭苰辵芢苄芵苜苁芽腄 103 
諂讫鉣里苍腃UTC 苌醼腃RTC 苌讟讋韊苰醝苢芷芠苧苤苩邭跴苉野芵苄腃釥譃躿被覻苰鞝青苉












RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苌闺諼苢 RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苌費迳裛躝苆芢芤诉鉛苈鋱裄苠芠苁芽



















































趡觱苌醛鎮苌郓鑃苍腃觟迨苈辉諺鑺閪苰赳苈苁芽 AQMD 苉芠苨腃諩识苌赳鎮苍腵RTC 苖苌鞊
苨芷芬腶苅苍苈芭腵诉苟苄趇鞝鍉苈酉釰腶芾苁芽苆芢芤苗芫芩苠鉭苪苈芢腄 
 
艓腄諩识苍 RTC 苌軹讋苉論芷苩銷諺鍉諏鍟苰貇芯苄芢芽苌苅苍苈芢芩 
 
芵芩芵腃芾芩苧苆芢苁苄諩识苌郓鑃苍苜苁芽芭苈芢芩苆芢苁芽苧镋芸芵苠芻芤苅苍苈芢苆蹶
苭苪苩腄苈芺苈苧腃RECLAIM 苉蹑见芵芽諩识苍腃辫鞈苌 RTC 苌軹讋苉論芵苄轜閪苈靜醪苰赳
芢腃芻苌覿詩鎮購苰販趞英芾迣苅苌赳鎮苰軦苩苌芪腃蹳迪豯跏苌诘苅芠苩芩苧苅芠苩腄辫鞈苌
靜酺苰賫苁苄釥芫苈醹躸苰铭苩諩识芪腃芻苪苍蹳迪談鞝軒苌郓鑃苅芠苩苆芢芤苌苍貾質鎹鉦苅













AQMD 苍腃 RECLAIM 荶莍荏莉莀苌郝豶苉鎖芽苨腃 鉐较苈 RTC 軦裸蹳迪苌鎱鏼苰貈鋨芵芽腄
花苌苦芤苈貈鋨苌鑷豩苉苍腃难苧芩苉腃艐艘艖艏鑎釣裈赾苌鑲软跭貸荎莌荗荢荧腩Emission 









































芪鑀覽苉閡蹇苈荖荘荥莀苈苌芩苉苂芢苄苌讳豐苰鎾芽腄 腵諩识苉鑃芹苦腶 腃 腵諩识苉裓蹶貈鋨苌轟




























Recent Development in Environmental Economics 2003 
鑰諼閨辈鞝邧鍸苌觛釨苆鍗陝 

























                                                        








芤苈荞荃荶苌論豗軥里芪論苭苁苄芢芭芩苰販苄芢芭苆腃裈覺苌 3 苂苌荞荃荶芪赬芦苧苪苩腄 
1.  鑲软軒腃辈鞝軒苉苦苁苄鑰諼閨芪蹳迪苅軦裸芳苪苩腄 
2.  迣譌 1 苌鞬苪苉賶认軥里芪論豗芷苩腄 
3.  迣譌 1 苌鞬苪苉邶蹙軒芪論豗芷苩腄 
1 苍苭芪趑苅芢芦苎蹙识鑰諼閨腃2 苍裪铊鑰諼閨苌辈鞝赜醢苌荞荃荶苅芠苩腄苜芽腃跰趡苅苍腃
辈閪迪苌镎钗腃辈鞝铯靰苌趂鎫腃镳陀鎊諼苌醝见苈苇苌躞釣苌闏覻芪芠苩腄芻苌苦芤苈銆苅腃
跅诟苌靥諭闯醕韞苢视鍤苉論芷苩莊荔荃荎莋苌邧鍸覻苍 2 芩苧 3 苌鎮芫苅芠苨腃躩鎮軔苌莊荔
荃荎莋苌邧鍸覻苍 1 芩苧 3 苖苌鎮芫苅芠苩腄芳苧苉腃蹙识鑰諼閨辈鞝苌賶认論非苌苦芤苉 1 芩








































1.  镳陀鎊諼芪钭詯芳苪苩芩苇芤芩腩钭詯鞦苌離釨腪 
2.  鎊諼軀赳軒芪鏁鋨芳苪苩芩苇芤芩腩鍅钭鞦苌離釨腪 
3.  辈鞝莋腛荧苰鏁鋨苅芫苩芩苇芤芩腩荽荪荴荆荘荧苌離釨腪 













苄芢苩腄花苪苍腃諂讫迈芪賶詊芵苄芢苩鎊諼韊苌 100 鑻苅芠苩腄 
郎鍮躁苌 4000 障荧莓苆芢芤邔躚苍腃裈覺苌苦芤苉蹚软芵苄芢苩腄苜芸腃醍鑲软韊 4 覭荧莓苌
芤芿腃钼邔芪躩軐辈鞝芨苦苑躩軐莊荔荃荎莋芳苪苩苆芷苩苆腃蹣苨苌 2 覭荧莓芪裏釵辈鞝芳苪
苩腄花苌 2 覭荧莓苌鑰諼閨苍鑪跓腃袳轫腃迄議苈苇苌銆諔辈鞝蹻郝苉襞苎苪腃轫貸芳苪苩腄轫
貸鞦苍 50%苆芵苄芢苩花苆芩苧腃銆諔辈鞝蹻郝芩苧鑲软芳苪苩鑰諼閨苍 1 覭荧莓苆芢芤花苆苉
苈苩
4腄銆諔辈鞝蹻郝苅苍腃辈鞝鑜韍裈迣苌鑰諼閨苰軳釵芵苄芢苩苆貾苭苪腃芻苌草腛药腛荴莍
                                                        
3  花花邔鑎腃镳陀鎊諼韊苍 40 障荧莓酏賣苅芠苁芽芪腃2002 鑎12 貎苉钭镜芳苪芽 2001 鑎鍸苌镳陀鎊
諼韊苍 24 障荧莓苆釥閝苉貸辭芵苄芢苩腄芽芾芵腃貏邔苍醝见芵苄芨苨腃镳陀鎊諼芪苈芭苈苁苄芫芽
苆苍貾芦苈芢腄 






















                                                                                                                                                                  




貸鞦苍腃莊荔荃荎莋腩100%腪 腃迄議豮辈鞝腩90%腪 腃鑪跓腅袳轫豮辈鞝腩60腠80%腪 腃覘鍄豮腩鉅邅腪
辈鞝腩80%腪苅芠苨腃轤譀鑪跓苉苦苩轫貸鞦苍 30%苉芷芬苈芢腄 
5  郎鍮[3腃 235-236 荹腛荗]苉苦苩苆腃草腛药腛荴莍腛鞦苍銆諔辈鞝蹻郝苉芨芯苩荽荪荴荆荘荧苌郏苝
迣芰豶蹚苰芷苪苎苭芩苩苆芵腃芻苌軀釔苍 200%苰銴芦苄芢苩苆轱苗苄芢苩腄 
6  苈芨腃2003 鑎 1 貎苉钭镜芳苪芽 2001 鑎鍸苌軀郑苉苦苩苆腃醍鑲软韊苍 4 覭600 障荧莓苆铷醝芵苄
芢苩芪腃跅轉辈閪韊苍 4500 障荧莓苆貸辭芵苄芢苩腄 
7  花花苅苍腃 腵莊荔荃荎莋韊苍腁軨酉闊莉荃莓苅腁軳釵韊苌 10腠20%鋶鍸腶苆芵苄芢苩芪腃 腵軳釵韊腶
苍 2 覭荧莓苅芠苨腃芻苌 10%苆芵苄苠 1000 障荧莓苌邔躚苉趇苭苈芢腄詭鑆苰靶芷苩芪腃记苧芭銆諔



























2 覭荧莓 116 
花苌邔躚苍芠芭苜苅苠還豶苅芠苁苄腃邳芵芢苆苍賀苧苈芢腄鏁苉腃莊荔荃荎莋韊 1000 障荧莓
芪镳难韄苅芠苨腃芻苌釥芫芳躟釦苅镳陀鎊諼韊芪辭苈芭苈苩观鑜邫芪芠苩腄苆苍芢芦腃覼苉镳
















郂遘腅諢軨貧讫苌镳陀鎊諼躖貏苅苍腃花苌闻陀苰諜苟腃鑲软躖识軒苰誄苨软芵腃2002 鑎 12 貎





                                                        
8  苜芽腃郎鍮躁苍腃闊苌還豶闻陀苅镳陀鎊諼韊苰鑎諔 4000 障荧莓苆蹚软芵苄芢苩腩酓趑蹙识鑰諼閨
顁趇觯[19]腪 腄花苪苉苦苩苆腃軱鍳貗苅誈鎮芵苄芢苩镳陀鎊諼苌荟莓荶腩10 荧莓軔腪芪 3000 釤苆詭
鑆芳苪苄芢苩苆芢芤腄芻苪芩苧酓趑苅苍 1 障釤苆芵腃芻苌荟莓荶芪顁鏺镳陀鎊諼苰芷苩花苆苅 4000
障荧莓苆苈苩苌苅芠苩腄花花苅苠腃酓趑苅 1 障釤苆芢芤還豶苰苇苌苦芤苉芵芽苌芩腃苜芽芻苌苦芤
苈荟莓荶芪隈鏺镳陀鎊諼苰芵苄芢苩苌芩苈苇譞離苍蹣苩腄 
9  鎌覜鏺闱 2002 鑎12 貎26 鏺苦苨腄 
10  郂遘貧苍腃鑲软躖识軒苌銲趸腅郓鑃鋇譹野跴苌苙芩諂讫跄邶豶触腃覘郵詧蹕陨蹾野跴苰諜苟苄 20



















覺邿识軒芪貳邿识軒苦苨 x 苌韊苌镳靶閨苰鉐裊鎖芽苨 w 苌覿詩苅钃芢軦苩苆芷苩腄花苌 x 苌
芤芿腃閔镩苌莊莆腛荘苢酦跞苌莊荔荃荎莋苅 ] 1 , 0 [ 1 ∈ −α 苌誄趇芪铌钄观鑜苅芠苨腃芻苌腩閽
诏腪覿詩苰 p 苆芷苩腄裪闻腃1腼莿苌誄趇芪鑰諼閨苆芵苄辈鞝芳苪腃芻苌芽苟苉蹸閥芤辈鞝腩裏
釵腪铯靰苰 c 苆芷苩腄花苌铯靰苍腃鍋邳苉辈鞝芷苩苆芫 cg腃镳陀鎊諼芷苩苆芫 cb苌铯靰芪芩芩
苨腃  cg  膄  cb 苆芷苩腄花苪苧苦苨腃覺邿识軒苌鞘辁苍腃 cx w px ) 1 ( α α − − − 苆苈苨腃花苪芪荛
莍裈迣苅芠苩苆芷苩苆腃镳靶閨苌钃軦覿詩苍腃 cx px w ) 1 ( α α − − ≤ 苆苈苩腄花花苅腃鍋邳辈鞝
苰芷苩迪趇苍腃 
                                                                                                                                                                  
鋶鍸苌誄趇苰部苟苩芩苍鋨芩苅苍苈芢腄 
11  跗鍣[21]苙芩腄 118 
x c px w g g ) 1 ( α α − − ≤   (1)
镳陀鎊諼苰芷苩迪趇苍腃 
x c px w b b ) 1 ( α α − − ≤   (2)
苆苈苩腄鞼躮苆苠苉鎙趆苅邬鞧芷苩苆芷苩苆腩苂苜苨腃貳邿识軒芪覺邿识軒苉野芵苄鞘辁荛莍













苰  腼wL 苆芷苩腩 0 , ≥ L H w w 腪 腄苂苜苨腃鋡鑎躮軔苍躩鎮軔觰里识軒芪荦荂腛莉腛芩苧辈鞝鞿
诠苌蹸閥芢苰軳芯苩苠苌苆芷苩腄芻苪芼苪苌釤邔苰 xH,  xL 苆芷苩苆腃芻苌閽诏覿詩





                                                        
12  鞼躮苆苠苉襅闓芪荽荃荩荘苌迪趇腃 0 ≤ w 苉苈苩腄苂苜苨腃覿詩苍譴靌辞覿詩苉苈苨腃貳邿识軒
































































1.  鉮裦轚隯 
2.  赳邭 
3.  鑲软躖识軒 
4.  鑲软躖识軒苌鎯识軒 













諄躋里邧苰轛軀芳芹苄芢苩鍳鎹镻貧苠芠苨腃芻苌邔苍醝见豘購苉芠苩腩镜 1腪 腄 
 
镜 1腆諂讫赳邭鉓鎖閔雥苉野芷苩豸蹀誯苌鑨貭腅软購迳讵腩软辊腆陫醺[14]腪 
鑎鍸  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 













14腄花苌芤芿腃鍳鎹镻貧苍 4 閪苌 1 苰蹸软芵腃蹣苨苌 4 閪苌 3 苌 6 覭襾苰花苌
諮诠芩苧软芷花苆苆苈苁苄芢苩腄苈芨腃諮诠苍跠鉣陀遬蹙识鑰諼閨辈鞝躖识違讻跠鉣芪談鞝芵
苄芢苩腄 
花苌諮诠苉隈鑎轗苟苧苪苩 6 覭襾苌芤芿腃3 閪苌 2 苰蹙识詅芪閉鉓芵腃蹣苨苰趑芪讒软芷苩
花苆苉苈苁苄芢苩腄苂苜苨腃蹙识詅芪閉鉓芷苩苌苍 4 覭襾苅芠苨腃貴迳觱閜铯靰苆還豶芳苪苩
8 覭襾苌钼閪苉芠芽苩腄芳苧苉腃花苌 4 覭襾苌閉鉓苰芢芭苂芩苌识詅苅鑺閪芵苄芢苩腄 
                                                        
13  邳躮苉苍 腵蹙识鑰諼閨鍋邳辈鞝還適諮诠腶 苆賄苔苦芤苅芠苩 腩蹙识鑰諼閨辈鞝躖识違讻跠鉣[18]腪 腄 
14  镳陀鎊諼軀釔銲趸荦腛荞 腩1993腠1995 鑎鍸腪 芩苧腃 鎊諼軒镳难苌镳陀鎊諼韊苰雱 10 障荧莓苆芵腃
陀觼邳苌靽邧賸觊苉苦苩鋡貸苌諺釒苰誄裸芢苄 8 覭襾苆芵苄芢苩 腩蹙识鑰諼閨辈鞝躖识違讻跠鉣[18]
苰蹑迆腪 腄 123 
花苌 4 覭襾苌鑺閪苉論芵苄苍腃諂讫迈芪賶镜芷苩镳陀鎊諼苌识軭闊苌荦腛荞苦苨腃貚郝识詅
芪袳鍼鍉苉醽芢花苆苈苇芩苧腃貚郝鉣里苉 70%腩2.8 覭襾腪苌閉鉓苰讁苟腃蹙鑰辈鞝识詅腩酓






















                                                        
15  芻苌醼蹙识詅苌 0.8 覭襾芤芿腃鍓赼腃躩鎮軔腃郎電腃视鍤腃询赳苌 5 鉣里芪詥 10%芸苂苰閉鉓芵腃
蹣苨苌 0.4 覭襾苰 30 芩苧 40 苌识詅鉣里芪閉鉓芵苄芢苩腄 
16  苈芨腃花苌諮诠苌讒软苍譠隱苅苍苈芭腃芠芭苜苅苠识詅鉣里苌躩軥鍉苈苠苌苉苦苩苠苌苆芵苄芢
苩腄芻苌芽苟腃迣轱苌苦芤苈镳隞芪芠苪苎腃讒软苰販趇芷花苆苠芠苨芤苩腄軀跛苉腃貚郝识腩2.8 覭

























                                                        
17  裈覺苌譌轱苦苨諮诠邧鍸芪鑧雤苰譎花芵苄芢苩花苆芪襍芦苩腄 腧酓趑询赳讦觯苉苦苩苆 腵閉鉓誄趇
苌誄苨違苨芤英苊英苆芢芤苦苨腷镳陀鎊諼芻苌苠苌苰苇芤芵芽苧苦芢芩腸 腃花苌顢苰钲芫苉腷諮诠芪
苇芤苌腸苆貾苁苄苠蹮苜苧苈芢腂苜芳苉蹙鑰苌镳陀鎊諼趪郢苌芠苨闻苉苂芢苄貟鎢苰轤苋芽迣苅腁


























                                                        
18  苠芿苫英腃鍋邳辈鞝芪郢野苆芢芤裄貏苉論芵苄苍腃鑆观识軒芪酉苎苪苄芢苩苦芤苅芠苩腩釥跣镻

















































  鞘靰鑰諼閨  辈閪鑰諼閨 
视鋫豮鑰諼閨  賶认  賶认 
躖识豮鑰諼閨  隯諔  賶认 
 
荨荃荣苌迪趇苍腃鑰諼閨辈鞝苉靌鞿覻芵苄芨苨腃賶认苌辈鞝识軒腩辈閪迪腪苉裸芫鍮芷跛苠
                                                        
20  鑰諼閨苌觱铰芨苦苑辈鞝苉論芷苩陀鞥腄1986 鑎邧鋨腄 
21  鑰諼閨苌铍裍芪詧釥芳苪芽貋觊腃 荨荃荣苅苍 腵鑰諼閨腶 苆芷苩韊芪雱 2 鑻苉苈苁芽苆芢芤 腩遄[5]腪 腄 
























諂讫迈苍腃2001 鑎 9 貎苦苨銆覛諂讫遒譣觯鑰諼閨腅莊荔荃荎莋閔觯鏠苉鑰諼閨腅莊荔荃荎莋
郪雥裏裵觯苰郝鞧芵腃詥軭识詅鉣里苢蹳隯鉣里腃躩躡里苈苇論豗軒苉野芷苩荱荁莊莓荏苰赳苈
苁苄芢苩腄2001 鑎 12 貎苉賶镜芳苪芽花苌荱荁莊莓荏貋觊腩諂讫迈[6]腪苉苦苩苆腃軦裸覿鉬苌
靌隳苉論豗苈芭腃镳靶閨苰赌芭鑰諼閨苆鋨譠芷苗芫苅芠苩苆芢芤裓販芪芠苩腄芻苌苦芤苈闱趐
辑苰荸腛荘苉鎯閔觯苅2002鑎1貎芩苧鑰諼閨苌鋨譠苰諜苟芽鑰諼閨苌諮陻離釨苌販銼芵芪譣顟129 












































































[1]  郳雘靭靓腩2002腪 腵詧釥邶蹙軒郓鑃苆鑰諼閨邭跴苌貤讆鎮購苆觛釨腶 腷跠邭詷貤讆腸 腃釦 30
趆腃102-110 荹腛荗腄 
[2]  袢閔遖腩2002腪 腵蹙识鑰諼閨镳陀鎊諼苌豯跏閪郍腶 腃隢鋨赥腄 
[3]  郎鍮邳觀腩2002腪 腷蹙鑰荒荬荎荖莇莓腸 腃WAVE 软铅腄 
[4]  釥跣镻蹙识鑰諼閨讦觯闒腩2001腪 腷轺諂豯跏腅鑰諼閨陀覺苉芨芯苩荨荃荣鑰諼閨辈鞝蹳迪譹
苑郪雥辈鞝躖识辊鑆鋨邧鍸苌軀釔腼苭芪趑苖苌靄韇躖识辊鑆鋨邧鍸鎱鏼苉跛芵苄苌鋱貾腸 腃
釥跣蹙识鑰諼閨讦觯腄 
[5]  遄軩鮉腩2001腪 腵鑰諼閨苌鋨譠腼覢轂苆苌铤該芩苧腶 腷芢英芾芷苆腸 腃vol.16腃No.9. 
[6]  諂讫迈腩2001腪 腵鑰諼閨腅莊荔荃荎莋邧鍸苌諮陻離釨苉論芷苩貟鎢貋觊苉苂芢苄腶 腃12 貎 18
鏺腄 
[7]  諂讫迈 腩2002腪 腵鑰諼閨腅莊荔荃荎莋邧鍸苌諮陻離釨苉論芷苩銆諔軦苨苜苆苟腶 腃 3 貎 22 鏺腄 
[8]  諂讫迈腩2002腪 腵鑰諼閨赳邭苉論芷苩趧鉫觯闱趐辑腶 腃6 貎腄 
[9]  諂讫迈腩2002腪 腵镳陀鎊諼陨蹾譹苑貴迳觱閜苉論芷苩趧鉫觯闱趐辑腶 腃7 貎腄 
[10] 諂讫迈 腩2002腪 腵鑰諼閨腅莊荔荃荎莋邧鍸苌諮陻離釨苉論芷苩邧鍸雊苌販銼芵鎙苉苂芢苄 腩闱
趐腪 腶 腃10 貎 18 鏺腄 
[11] 諂讫迈腩2002腪 腵趡賣苌鑰諼閨腅莊荔荃荎莋邧鍸苌距苨闻苉苂芢苄腩裓販误遜腪 腶 腃11 貎 22
鏺腄 
[12] 陫醺諬郩腩1998腪 腷蹙识鑰諼閨苖苌陀邭跴野覞腸 腃釦裪陀譋腄 
[13] 陫醺諬郩腩2000腪 腵鑰諼閨辈鞝陀 2000 鑎觼邳陀苌鎞鉂鍟腶 腷荗莅莊荘荧腸 腃No.1184腃9 貎 1
鏺趆腃48-58 荹腛荗腄 
[14] 陫醺諬郩腩2001腪 腵蹙识鑰諼閨镳陀鎊諼躖铆苉野芷苩豸蹀苌野覞腶 腷芢英芾芷苆腸 腃VOL.16腃
No.11腃14-19 荹腛荗腄 
[15] 陫醺諬郩腩2002腪 腵鑰諼閨苰苟芮苩跅诟苌躩躡里陀邭跴苌鎮購腶 腷鍳蹳邴酼腸 腃釦 55 說腃釦
245 趆腃1 貎趆腃6-8 荹腛荗腄 133 
[16] 趑跛铤該諂讫陀荚莓荞腛闒腩1998腪 腷軥靶趑苉芨芯苩跅遖鑰諼閨陀邧腸 腃辤躖陀隱貤讆觯 
[17] 趑鍹賰鋊迈腩2001腪 腵閽邬 12 鑎鍸₌郝閛蹙閨軀釔銲趸貋觊腶 腃 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/kisha/kisha01/01/011225/011225.pdf 





鎚遜腶 腃鎌讞鍳腃11 貎 30 鏺腄 
[21] 跗鍣襱蹭腩1999腪 腷荏荢荙苆药荢荙苌豯跏詷腸 腃鎌靭豯跏遖闱軐腄 
[22] 銆酝鞘静闒雳腩1999腪 腷轺諂豯跏腅鑰諼閨陀苌軀釔闱趐腼跅遖軥靶陀韟苆軀跛腸 腃荇荫腅荥
荂腛腅荇荘腄 
[23] 銆酝鞘静腩2001腪 腵荨荃荣轺諂豯跏腅鑰諼閨陀覺苉芨芯苩靄韇辈鞝躖识軒邧苆芵苄苌腵郪雥
辈鞝躖识辊邧鍸腶苌詔靶腶 腷貎誧鑰諼閨腸 腃2001-3 趆腄 
[24] 込醺譼镆腩1999腪 腷諂讫陀腸 腃邬閶鎰腄 
[25] 譻跨閶静腩2001腪 腵邳鑏迪苰豽芦芽貴迳觱閜諮诠腶 腷芢英芾芷苆腸vol16腃No.11腄 
[26] 蹒鍣靭腩1996腪 腵鑰諼閨苆靌覿閨腶 腷鎌靭陀詷腸40 說 1 趆腃97-125 荹腛荗腄 